The second month of the American-Israeli “NWO” against Iran has begun. A month, as opposed to three days, is a time that allows one to draw a disappointing conclusion: the blitzkrieg failed. The regime in Iran, despite its beheading, demonstrates its resilience and adaptability to the conditions of a prolonged war of attrition. Moreover, acting asymmetrically in some ways and mirror in others, he transformed the regional war in the Gulf into a global war. This article does not pretend to cover all dimensions of the Gulf War. The authors aimed to look deeper into various aspects of the economic dimension, state and possible consequences threatening the world after Trump and Netanyahu opened Pandora's box in the Gulf.
2026 vs 1973.
The Arab oil embargo against the West for its support of Israel was declared on October 20, 1973. As a result, there was an almost fourfold jump in oil prices, which provoked a global economic crisis with a further long-term restructuring of the economy towards the economical use of energy resources. This later led to a prolonged period of low oil prices (1985–1999).
If we take the beginning of the American-Israeli war against Iran on February 28, 2026 as the starting point of the current crisis in the Persian Gulf, then there is an interesting calendar symmetry of these two dates relative to January 1, 2000. Both dates are almost equidistant at a little over 26 years from New Year's Day. In days it is even more impressive 9569: 9556, that is, the difference is only 13 days.
We are not going to look for hidden meaning in such symmetry, but it should be noted that crises, as a rule, symbolize the completion of certain development cycles and the onset of others. Both periods analyzed, 1973–2000 and 2000–2026, in one way or another include two smaller periods of high and low oil prices: 1973–1985 and 1985–1999, as well as 2000–2014 and 2014–2026, respectively..
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When people are now arguing over how long the crisis caused by the Gulf War will last, then in fact it is necessary to ask another question: what will this war become - an accelerator or a decelerator of the transition to a new Kondratieff cycle War could further accelerate the energy transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources (RES), which began with the emergence of climate discourse in the 1990s and accelerated with rising oil prices in the 2000s.. Energy transitions are long-term inertial processes; they do not imply the immediate replacement of one resource with another. Energy crises cause a global economic crisis, because a sharp and prolonged rise in energy prices for all import-dependent economies means an inflation shock and a drop in GDP. This is exactly what happened in 1973 due to the Arab oil embargo caused by the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War.
There are two main options. First, hydrocarbons, due to their high prices, will provide an additional incentive for the development of renewable energy sources, and the share of renewable energy in the global energy balance will continue to grow, while fossil sources will continue to decline.. Considering that more than 53–54% of global oil demand is provided by the transport sector (automobile, aviation, shipping), it is safe to say that a prolonged period of high oil prices will mean an additional impetus for scaling up electric transport technologies and reducing the share of oil consumption in the global energy mix.
The second option is, on the contrary, a short period of revenge for hydrocarbons - a kind of counter-offensive against expensive renewable energy, when oil, having reached price heights, will eventually collapse, as it did in the mid-1980s, and fossil energy sources will retain their share in the energy mix for a short time. Example: Japan is recently opening long-closed coal power plants, expecting the energy crisis to worsen; Italy is ready to restart coal-fired power plants in the event of an energy crisis; Romania and Poland are reviewing plans to abandon coal generation.
But in any case, it looks like there is a serious multi-crisis ahead, not only military-political, caused by the Gulf War, but also economic. Moreover, the Persian Gulf, in contrast to its role as an exclusively oil hub of the planet 53 years ago, is now a multimodal hub.
Third Gulf War.
Considering the military-political situation, it can be noted that the current round of conflict in the Middle East appears to be a continuation of a number of geopolitical processes, the trigger for which was Operation Desert Storm by coalition forces led by the United States with a UN mandate in 1991, aimed at liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. It is known as the First Gulf War, which was followed in the next decade by the Second Gulf War, aimed at eliminating the aggressive regime in Iraq. That is why today's US-Israeli-Iranian confrontation is described as the Third Gulf War. From this perspective, the current escalation is not an isolated episode, but part of a longer-term strategic cycle. In essence, the United States today aims to correct the geopolitical consequences of the First and Second Gulf Wars, which were unforeseen at the time - to limit the ability of an aggressive force to dominate the regional geopolitical system. In the 1990s and 2000s it was Iraq under Saddam Hussein, now Iran under the rule of the ayatollahs, which is much more dangerous given its proxy networks, missile and nuclear programs and constant goal of destroying Israel. But today's Iran is not Iraq or Afghanistan, where the United States not only failed to achieve its initial goals, but also suffered a fiasco. The Persian Gulf is not what it was even at the beginning of the 21st century.
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Water.
When we look at the Gulf, the first thing we need to look at is not the problem of oil and gas, but the problem of water resources in a broader context. Everything that the Arab monarchies of the Gulf have achieved is, of course, thanks to oil and gas, but it all rests on water. Desalinated water has made the Arabian deserts of Rub al-Khali and Nefud suitable for life.. Therefore, in the first place of the region’s vulnerabilities is the water vulnerability of the Gulf countries. Critical water systems are on Iran's military radar. Desalination plants provide approximately half to almost 90% of national water supplies in selected Gulf countries. The strategic importance of desalination was described in a CIA assessment back in 2010, which stated that the disruption of desalination systems in the Persian Gulf " The same archival strategic analysis, still relevant today, noted that in the event of large-scale damage or destruction of desalination plants, the consequences could be much more serious than losses in the energy or industrial sector, up to and including humanitarian disaster or economic paralysis, and also emphasized the importance of creating strategic water reserves.
Importantly, although Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have built significant seawater desalination capacity, they have largely failed to build strategic reserves in case of supply disruptions. For example, the UAE unveiled its Water Security Strategy 2036 in 2017, aimed at improving water efficiency and increasing national water reserves. But the implementation of the initiative was supposed to provide water reserves for just two days of national demand under normal conditions by 2036, and for up to 16–45 days in case of emergency. Saudi Arabia has also created strategic reservoirs that provide only modest supplies of water, while Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar do not have sufficient storage capacity to compensate for significant supply disruptions. Large cities such as Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Doha, Kuwait City and Jeddah are now almost entirely dependent on the production and supply of desalinated water.
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In 2023, there were approximately 815 desalination plants in the GCC states, accounting for about 31% of global desalination capacity.
Not all is well with water in Iran either. The internal situation before the start of the war was characterized as water bankruptcy. After five years of extreme drought, water levels in the country's main reservoirs had dropped to a critical level of 10%, and the government was seriously considering an evacuation plan for Tehran.. The policy of uncontrolled dam construction and groundwater depletion has led to ground subsidence in the capital by 300 mm per year, which threatens the sustainability of the entire urban infrastructure. China has become Iran's only source of technology and capital for the implementation of large-scale water transfer projects. The 800-kilometer pipeline project from the Gulf of Oman to Isfahan, unveiled by President Masoud Pezeshkian in December 2025, has become a “strategic lifeline” for Iranian industry, in particular for steel giant Mobarakeh Steel.
Desalination is an energy-intensive process; about 3/4 of desalination plants in the GCC countries are integrated with energy and water supply complexes. Thus, the production of fresh water by these installations may be interrupted not only due to precision strikes on desalination plants. If Iranian attacks on energy generation take place, they will automatically affect water desalination systems. It is obvious that after Trump’s “imprudent statements” about strikes on Iran’s energy sector, industry experts strongly recommended that the US administration refrain from escalation, because Iran’s strikes in response will likely be directed at the industrial water and energy hubs of the Arab Gulf countries and could lead not only to economic collapse, but also to a humanitarian disaster.
Number.
The Gulf is a fast-growing global hub for computing power, cryptomining, AI, cloud infrastructure and a crossroads for sub- and intercontinental fiber optic links between Europe, India, Africa and Southeast Asia. Although the share of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf in the total number of data centers is small - approximately 1%, these are special digital hubs that until recently were rapidly developing. The Gulf countries are trying to replicate their role in oil, but in data and computing, since they have colossal savings in sovereign wealth funds, cheap energy resources (oil, gas, solar) and government digital transformation programs. The "
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Data centers are critical infrastructure at the refinery level when compared to the oil sector. The UAE is the main “cloud hub” in the region, an interconnector between Europe, Africa and Asia. Oman and Bahrain play the role of “cable gateways”, that is, fiber-optic communication lines running through Salalah, Muscat and Manama provide digital transit from India to the Middle East and further to Europe, and vice versa. There is a large flow of financial information through Qatar.
It must be borne in mind that data centers are extremely vulnerable, especially in the Gulf region with its hot climate: the Arabian Peninsula is not Scandinavia, you need to spend a lot of energy cooling the servers. Therefore, attacks on electrical substations, emergency power supplies and cooling systems threaten to disable data centers. And in the event of the destruction of desalination plants, from which water also flows into the cooling systems of data centers, the first of the cascade of consequences will be their shutdown, then the rapid degradation of global services (banks, exchanges, logistics, e-governance, etc.). ), overload and disruptions in other digital hubs, in particular the European.
Iran's attacks on AWS facilities in the UAE and Bahrain have already led to service failures. Digitalization of oil and gas infrastructure in the Gulf region has increased its vulnerability. In the event of a large-scale defeat of digital in the region, one of the cascading consequences will be a negative impact on the oil and gas sector, which in turn will cause an additional shortage of energy resources.
Fertilizers.
Another consequence must be considered a reduction in the supply of mineral fertilizers, a significant part of which comes to the world market from the Middle East. The Gulf region is one of the global centers for the production of nitrogen fertilizers (ammonia, urea, nitrate) thanks to cheap natural gas as a raw material. Urea leakage from the Gulf due to the Hormuz problem is not just a logistical glitch, but a shock to the global nitrogen market.
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The most vulnerable are India, Brazil, and African countries, where there will be a physical shortage of fertilizers, and not only because of a price jump. It should be noted that producers from the USA, Canada and Russia will benefit, because they also have cheap gas, but supplies from there will not be able to quickly close the deficit.
Along with rising natural gas costs, fertilizer shortages could significantly impact the agricultural sector, reduce food production and increase instability in many countries around the world, particularly on the Dark Continent. Predictably, Russia will rush there with its urea and Afrika Korps with help. China, which is a major player in the global nitrogen fertilizer market, will find itself in a difficult position, but in a crisis situation it always limits exports, preferring to ensure the domestic market to support food security.
Oil and gas.
According to UN Trade and Development, about 20% of all seaborne oil trade on the world market passed through Hormuz, and in the last weeks before the outbreak of the Gulf War this share was 38%, and it was intended mainly for Asian countries. The Strait of Hormuz is particularly important for transporting 19% of the world's liquefied natural gas and 29% of its liquefied petroleum gas..
The Gulf War predictably caused a jump in oil prices. In 2025, the price showed downward dynamics, fluctuating in the range of $80–60. (Brent) per barrel during the year. After the start of the US-Israeli operation on February 28, 2026, the price of Brent jumped from around $78. to almost $100. per barrel and on record days exceeded $110. per barrel.
The impossibility of tankers passing through Hormuz not only led to the overflow of oil storage facilities in the Gulf countries, but also forced Arab countries to reduce production by at least 10 million barrels. per day, which is almost half of the daily volumes passing through the Strait of Hormuz - 15–20 million barrels. More than 3 million barrels. per day, oil refining capacity in the region has already stopped due to attacks and the lack of export routes, which has increased the insurance premium on the European oil products market.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have partially redirected their oil exports through routes bypassing Hormuz. The Saudis have maximized the pumping of raw materials through the trans-Arabian East-West oil pipeline with access to the Yanbu terminal in the Red Sea, the UAE - to the oil pipeline to Fujairah with access to the Gulf of Oman.
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Due to negative dynamics in the global oil market, the Trump administration resorted to easing sanctions policy against Russia. In early March, the US granted India a temporary 30-day permit to purchase Russian oil that was already loaded onto tankers and at sea as of March 5, 2026. On March 12, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury officially authorized the shipment and sale of Russian oil (and petroleum products), which were loaded onto tankers before March 12, 2026, for a period until April 11, 2026.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) recommended releasing 400 million barrels to stabilize prices on the market.. from the strategic reserves of 32 member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Reserves consist of their government reserves - a total of 1.2 billion barrels. and mandatory commercial - 600 million barrels. In theory, this is enough to cover more than 140 days of imports. The United States alone has reserves of approximately 410 million barrels. , but this volume is significantly less compared to 2022, when US strategic reserves amounted to 700 million barrels. In France, according to the IEA, as of March of this year, the equivalent volumes in reserves are at the level of 117 days of net imports.
The coordinated release of part of these reserves to the market is one of the measures activated to stabilize prices. It is important that decisions on such issues have been made only five times before since the founding of the IEA in 1973. The last two times occurred during the 2022 energy crisis caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.. It is important that this instrument is of limited effectiveness, because the release of reserves is intended to solve the problem of temporary disruptions in physical supplies, but cannot absorb a geopolitical shock if the blockage of the strait continues for a long time. Moreover, the situation will worsen if the problem of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is added to the problem of Hormuz, which is still under the influence of fire defeats by the Yemeni Houthis. These Iranian proxies have already announced their intention to resume the blockade of the strait and are threatening to strike the Saudi Yanbu terminal in the Red Sea.
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The global natural gas market operates under the influence of a number of determinants, including not only market, technological, regulatory and financial, but also geopolitical. The mutual overlap of these determinants exacerbates not only inter-fuel competition, but also competition between regional markets - European and Asian.
The European Union remains dependent on natural gas imports. The cold winter of 2025/2026 led to the depletion of gas reserves in gas storage facilities, and the threat of interruption of liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies from Qatar (which is now about 12 billion cubic meters, or 3.8% of total imports to the European market) led to concerns and risks of imbalance in the overall gas import policy. The share of LNG from Qatar in EU gas imports has never been commensurate with leading suppliers. The shortage of supplies from the Gulf affects the overall price dynamics of LNG in the world and the security of its supplies to the European market. Now the USA is the main supplier of LNG to the EU with a share of about 58%. Last year, gas imports from the United States rose to almost 80 billion cubic meters, almost four times more than in 2021. And last year’s decrease in import volumes from the Russian Federation by almost 50% was offset by LNG supplies from the USA, which is an important factor allowing the EU to pursue a policy of abandoning Russian gas.
However, an increasingly significant factor of influence, along with the Gulf War, is the unpredictable policy of the United States, where on the American side there is an interest in long-term contracts with European consumers, and on the European side - distrust in the possible political decisions of the American president and reluctance to lose other sources of gas supplies against the backdrop of uncertainty with their own gas demand.
Helium.
Following Qatar's announcement of a suspension of LNG exports, helium exports were also halted as it is a by-product of natural gas processing.. This is important because helium is critically used in several stages of semiconductor production - for cooling and high-precision technological processes. In 2025, Qatar provided about a third of global helium production - 63 million cubic meters of the total global market capacity of 190 million cubic meters were supplied from Qatar.
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Every month without freedom of navigation through Hormuz means that the global market loses 5.2 million cubic meters of helium from Qatar.. Accordingly, the longer the blockage of the strait lasts, the more noticeable the shortage will be.. For the military-industrial complex, helium is a critical resource, and a prolonged blockage of the strait (more than five months) will lead to production restrictions for semiconductors, sensors and high-precision electronics.
As of the beginning of April, there is no shortage of helium on the market, but some signals indicate the beginning of an actual imbalance in the production chain: helium suppliers have switched to its manual redistribution, microchip manufacturers have switched to internal quotas and prioritization of product output. This is a classic sign of the transition from market to operational management in the global semiconductor chain on the eve of the impending crisis. Spot helium prices have already doubled since disruptions began in Qatar.. Qatar's Energy Minister Saad al-Kaabi admitted that even if the crisis ends immediately, normalization of supplies will take weeks or months..
Military prospects.
Iran's ayatollahs are preparing for war. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has learned the lessons of many years of hidden confrontation with the United States. After the “12-day war” in June last year, anticipating further attacks by the US and Israel, Iran’s military leaders decided on a strategy for confrontation. The IRGC generals, when developing the concept of war, proceeded from the assumption that, according to the balance of forces in a “conventional” war against the United States and Israel, Iran has no chance of winning: a stronger enemy at the very beginning of the war will try to destroy the leadership and control system of Iran, which will require an asymmetric response, “stretching the conflict in time and space.”.
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Strategically, this time, instead of relying primarily on regional allies that once formed the front line of defense, Tehran now operates primarily on its own. Iranian strategists are launching asymmetrical strikes against US assets in the region while seeking to pressure oil supplies - an indirect strategy aimed at creating economic pressure, especially on Trump to end the war.. As you can see, this turned out to be unexpected for the head of the White House and his unprepared team.. Iran wants this “surprise” to be a shock for America: Tehran turns armed confrontation into an economic shock for the enemy.
Instead of concentrating its limited forces on a defensive stand, Tehran has gone on the offensive, launching a campaign of missile and drone strikes across the Persian Gulf region.. “This is asymmetric warfare in its purest form, in which Iran achieves extreme, even global consequences with a small number of attacks that inflict painful casualties,” said Michael Eisenstadt, director of the Defense and Security Studies Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy..
This IRGC strategy necessitates a ground operation for the United States to ensure freedom of navigation in Hormuz, which, given the scale of Iran, is unlikely to be successful. The capture of a number of islands in the strait area, as well as the largest Iranian oil terminal on Kharg Island, will be accompanied by numerous losses of American personnel. This will have serious domestic political consequences for Trump and the Republicans.. But the main thing is that control over the Hormuz zone and the terminal does not guarantee the impossibility of fire destruction of objects in the Persian Gulf zone, taking into account the tactical and technical characteristics of the weapons that the IRGC still has at its disposal.
Where are we going
The third Gulf War is one way or another a reflection of the growing contradictions between the United States and China. The shale revolution made the US independent of Middle Eastern oil. China gradually filled the position of the main importer of oil and LNG from the Gulf countries and became their main trade and economic partner.. When considering different forecasts, it is necessary to take into account the fact that the Trump administration wants to concentrate the main oil and gas resources of the planet under its control: not only in order to prevent the growth of a strategic competitor - China, but also to become a “global operator”, a dominant player in the market, which will make America “great again”, will give the opportunity to dictate to everyone - by right of the strong - its rules of the game.
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This is supported by the fact that, unlike the Biden administration, the Trump administration is calmly observing the systemic actions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces to gradually destroy Russian oil logistics and refining. This is in the interests of American majors, to whom the current owner of the White House owes his presidency not least. Trump believes that in Venezuela, where the largest oil deposits on the planet are concentrated, he has achieved his goal. He set the same goal, by his own admission in an interview with the FT on March 29, 2026, with regard to Iranian oil. But now it’s clear that this won’t work with Iran.. That's why Trump postponed his visit to China until May, hoping to end the Gulf War by then and arrive in Beijing imagining himself as the winner..
China finds itself at the center of the Gulf geopolitical triangle, where its role as an economic giant and partner of the Gulf countries - both Iran and the Arab monarchies - is intertwined with the need to ensure the stability of sea routes. China has strategic partnerships with almost all key energy exporters in the Persian Gulf, forming for itself a system of energy security and logistics corridors within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative.. For Beijing, the Gulf War is a complex threat. At the same time, a unique window of opportunity appears to resolve the “Taiwan issue” as the “peacekeeper of all times and peoples” becomes increasingly bogged down in the war with Iran and will not be able to operate simultaneously in the Middle Eastern and Pacific theaters of military operations.
Unlike the resource-intensive economies of Asian countries - Japan, China, South Korea, India, which depend on hydrocarbon supplies from the Gulf, the dependence of the European Union is not existential in terms of volumes, but is critical in terms of prices and market stability. The existing 90-day strategic oil reserves will help out until mid-summer. The situation with gas is more problematic, or more precisely, with the creation of its reserves in underground storage facilities for the next winter period. The EU has already been hardened since 2022 - as a result of Russia’s actions to “drain” the gas market and Gazprom’s promotion of price escalation.
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The European Union faces the challenge of ensuring replenishment of gas reserves against the backdrop of dwindling supply and rising prices on the global market, maintaining a political line of rejecting Russian gas and protecting itself in case Trump is tempted to use LNG supplies to Europe for political purposes. One of the markers of the determination and consistency of the energy independence policy should be the development of the intra-European market for biomethane, low-carbon hydrogen and its derivatives.
A challenge for the EU could be Russian sabotage actions disguised as accidents on Norwegian production platforms in the North Sea and pipelines through which gas flows to continental Europe. This is a scenario that will allow Russia to worsen the energy crisis, and then “come to the rescue” and “save the Europeans” in the winter by offering to resume supplies of its gas. This scenario had already played out successfully until September 2022 with an upward trend in gas prices due to the cessation of supplies via Yamal-Europe and Nord Stream, until Nord Stream 2 was blown up by “unknown actors.”. But this did not prevent the EU from continuing its course towards a gradual abandonment of Russian pipeline gas. Whether the EU will be able to withstand the pressure of various lobbyists and resist the Kremlin’s gas temptation this time is an open question. Especially taking into account the amorphous behavior of the European Commission regarding the Druzhba oil pipeline, the inability to confiscate Russian assets, implement the decision of the EU Council to allocate 90 billion euros in aid to Ukraine, open the import of biomethane and green electricity from Ukraine, etc..
In these circumstances, the use of significant free capacity of underground gas storage facilities in Ukraine would significantly contribute to the creation of a strategic gas reserve of the EU, which would significantly enhance its energy security.
The EU continues to invest heavily in renewable energy, energy efficiency and the reduction of fossil fuels, but at the same time, all this is strengthening the position of populist political forces on the right and left, proposing a return to Russian gas as a way to solve the problem of price and availability.
Finally, it should be noted that regardless of how the Third Gulf War ends, it becomes a prologue to tectonic shifts not only in the energy sector, as was the case in the 70s of the last century, but also in the global economy and politics. This is a consequence of the fact that the countries of Western democracy have given freedom of action to the herostrats of our time - Putin, Trump, and the lesser Orbans and Fizos.. The specter of a global economic crisis looms large in the fog of the Third Gulf War.
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It is likely that Trump is beginning to crawl away from the Gulf, blaming everyone around him for everything, and above all his NATO allies who did not come to his aid.. However, crawling away does not mean the war will be over. It will continue because Trump's wishes mean little to both Iran and Israel. It seems that, simultaneously with preparations for the ground operation, the administration of the “non-Nobel laureate” will carry out a maneuver to switch attention to another issue - once again putting pressure on Ukraine, persuading President Vladimir Zelensky to capitulate under the guise of a “peace treaty” and “security guarantees” from the United States, the zero price of which is now clearly visible in the example of Arab allies in the Gulf; the topic of Greenland will come up again as an option for revenge on Europe.
Under the circumstances described, Ukraine and Europe need to prepare for worst-case scenarios. Improving the prospects for Europe is only possible as a result of inflicting a military defeat on Russia, which in one way or another covertly supports the Iranian regime, since the Third Gulf War not only brings additional revenue to the Russian budget thanks to high oil prices, but also distracts the attention of the West, splits it and reduces support for Ukraine. Just as the US and Israel are trying to end the Iranian proxies, the EU needs to end the Russian proxies within itself - the regimes of Orban, Fico and the numerous far left and right formations under the guise of political parties, which Russia helps to come to power in their countries.
Against the backdrop of the slowdown in EU sanctions policy and the reversal of American sanctions, the Ukrainian Defense Forces urgently need to not only continue, but also intensify effective “sanctions actions” in the continental depths of Russia and in the spaces of the World Ocean.
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