In about a year and a half, residence permits under the temporary asylum program for Ukrainians in EU countries will expire. About six million of our fellow citizens will face a choice - to stay or return. We can already say that not everyone will be able to return. Perhaps there will not be as many of those who return as we would like. But does this mean that for Ukraine these people are simply a lost resource Emigration is not death after all.

In every somewhat noticeable city in the southern region of Italy, in addition to the obligatory monument to fallen soldiers - a common part of the urban landscape both here in Ukraine and in Europe - you will find a monument, a square, or at least a memorial sign to emigrants. Before becoming a country of immigration, Italy experienced a real exodus in the 20th century, losing up to 30 million people to emigration. The losses were sometimes quite literal: to this day, Italy celebrates the National Day of Remembrance for Migrant Workers in honor of the Italian miners who died in the Bois du Cazier mine accident in Belgium.

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The example of Italy shows that the word “loss” is not always relevant in relation to emigrants. More than anything, it's an opportunity.. Not only individual - for those who left “for a better life”. But also for my native land. The first thing people usually talk and write about in Italy about emigration is its huge contribution to the post-war industrialization of the country and, in general, to the Italian “economic miracle”. Emigration turned out to be such a powerful resource that it was even stimulated by the state, which at that moment could not provide its population with either work or social programs. The efforts of the state were aimed mainly at ensuring that emigrants do not lose touch with their country of origin and do not forget who they are and where they come from.. Preserved family ties. Had ample opportunities for economic interaction with those who remained at home. Formed stable communities in places of settlement. This policy of “preserving Italianness” echoes to this day - despite the fact that Italy now receives more migrants than it sends out. Thus, despite political pressure inside and outside the country, Italy stubbornly maintains “citizenship by blood” and does not accept “citizenship by soil”: a child born anywhere in the world receives Italian citizenship if at least one of his parents is Italian.

It's hard for us to understand. Although at a certain stage Ukrainian labor emigration was very similar to Italian. A large role in this difference was played by the Soviet attitude towards emigrants - as traitors, outcasts, scum. Almost until the very end of the “great country,” emigration was a kind of “little death” - a person seems to be alive, but is crossed out and erased from the lives of those who remained.

The next wave of migration from Ukraine consisted of “migrant workers”, to whom the attitude of the Ukrainian society was generally disdainful. Despite the fact that their contribution to the economy was more positive than negative. The “worker” in the mass consciousness remained predominantly a representative of the social lower classes - a loser who was unable to “find a place for himself,” “realize himself,” “having failed there, having been born,” and instead “rolled” around the world in pursuit of a long dollar or a profitable marriage (the general voice is especially merciless towards women).

A full-scale war did not make us softer towards “those who escaped”. On the contrary, it brought back the taste of betrayal to emigration. It spread not only to those who actually ran away - hid from mobilization. But also for all those who took refuge from the hardships of war - fell out of the general military context, from the experience of war.

Against this background, the question of the return of emigrants to Ukraine seems both important and alien. “Return the population” is a rational requirement for the survival of the post-war economy. But whether the “population” will return will depend on the decision of each individual. From his personal choice.

This means that those who still hope for the “return of the population” need to do two different things at the same time: look for arguments to convince those who can be persuaded to return, and look for ways to use those who cannot be returned..

Or rather, we will have to start not even with a search for arguments - with lowering the degree of public discussion. Which will be very difficult. Military emigration turned out to be a very difficult subject for public discussion. On the one hand, economists pour out pessimistic demographic forecasts, which become apocalyptic if a significant number of emigrants fail to return. On the other hand, the line that divided Ukrainian society on the issue of emigration turned into a geological fault during the war years. Its edges continue to diverge - each side takes root in its own reality, which is not at all similar to the reality of the opposite side. Each side affirms the correctness of its own decision - and does so the more harshly, the more difficult this decision was given to it.

Work on both sides of this fault will be different, but equally challenging. For those who left, Ukraine will have to compete with host countries. This won't be easy for two reasons.. The first - the most socially and economically active part of the emigrants have already taken root in the new reality. The children have adapted - they can no longer be distinguished from the locals. And what’s more important is that they no longer distinguish themselves from the locals. We need very good reasons to break these ties - which were very difficult - and repeat the cycle of moving, adapting, establishing connections in a post-war country. During the war years, it became completely different. Perhaps - quite alien.

The second reason is that our state not only does not know how to compete for citizens, but generally does not consider it necessary to even think about them in such a context. In the post-Soviet state consciousness, a citizen belongs to the state simply by the fact of birth and the presence of an appropriate passport. Our government is more likely to propose to European governments to expel from host countries all Ukrainians who arrived after February 24, 2022 - to return to Ukraine “what belongs to it” - than to make compelling proposals for voluntary return.

Here the authorities are easy to understand: the policy of “goodies” towards emigrants will be very difficult to explain to those “who did not escape”. These people, who survived the hardships of war, will for the most part be irritated by the expense of money and effort to return those who left. This will seem unfair to many. And when it comes to justice, the conversation turns from serious to truly painful. Hunger for justice (or rather, for satisfaction) is the fuel on which people survive this war. For many of us, it is even stronger than the hunger for a peaceful life. That is why it is so difficult—almost impossible—to sacrifice justice for the sake of expediency.. Even when it comes to physical survival.

But simply deleting, losing several million of its citizens - including young, economically active ones - is an extravagance that Ukraine cannot afford. Even while remaining abroad, Ukrainians can still become a factor useful for their country - as a political, economic, cultural force. They may, however, not become so - then we will have another bold cross in the column of lost opportunities.

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Economic support from foreign Ukrainians is the most obvious advantage. The funds that were transferred by labor migrants to Ukraine before the full-scale invasion constituted a significant part of domestic GDP. In 2021, for example, workers transferred more than $15 billion. After February 24, 2022, the flow of private transfers to Ukraine from abroad did not stop and did not even become too shallow. This is not a decisive injection into the economy, but it is significant, permanent and socially significant, since this money often supports local businesses, households and those people for whom our budget never has enough funds for social payments.

Emigrants traditionally constitute a small but stable market for domestic products. Moreover, we are not only talking about the constant assortment of “Eastern European stores” (the latest wave of Ukrainian migrants no longer calls them “Russian”). “Buy Ukrainian” long before the war ceased to be just a slogan and became a habit for many. For those who left, there is still the opportunity to buy Ukrainian goods through online stores. And receive it from Ukraine using the Ukrainian postal service. Judging by the reports, Novaya Poshta made the right decision by opening its representative offices in Europe. And I have almost no doubt that the bulk of its European clientele are Ukrainian migrants. One of the main conditions for the preservation of this market is resistance to assimilation. Traditionally, the creation of communities and fraternities, cultural centers and church parishes protects from assimilation.

But successful economic exchange between the diaspora and the “mainland” will require changes in domestic legislation regarding remittances and taxation. What in the short term may seem like an “unaffordable luxury”.

There are many lessons about the role the diaspora can play in politics.. Israeli diaspora in the United States. Russian agents of influence under the guise of cultural centers and Orthodox societies. And even our Ukrainian diaspora in Canada, which, during the darkest period of the Holodomor, conveyed to the world the truth about what was happening in Ukraine. Even after living only a few years in another country, the majority of our compatriots have a sufficient command of local languages, understand the culture, and have developed social connections - all this allows them to influence the opinions of the local population (they are also voters), adapt messages that are important for Ukraine about Ukraine, about our war, about our enemy.

The main difficulty is to understand what we need. We are too accustomed to living on the “globe of Ukraine”, not being too interested in what is happening in the rest of the world. And when we have a war, we are surprised (and offended) to discover that we are “not heard”, are not supported enough and not in the way we would like. Emigration strengthens ties with the outside world. Unless, of course, the emigrants “die” for their homeland by crossing the border.

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But dealing with emigrants will not be easy for the authorities. While maintaining Ukrainian citizenship, they remain voters who are not subject to a standard set of promises (and manipulations) compiled and adapted for voters in Ukraine. Previously, this did not seem like a big problem - the number and activity of voters abroad have always been underestimated. But several million emigrants could have a significant impact on elections. It will not be at all easy to work with this part of the electorate - they do not live in “one new thing” and judge events in their home country a little differently than those who are inside. It may seem, again, unfair to leave the right to vote to those who are “not here”.

But this “external” part of Ukrainians, distributed throughout the planet, can play a significant role in preserving values \u200b\u200band ideals - national and democratic - that may fade and shake against the backdrop of post-war political, economic and simply human dramas. Anyone who remembers the Ukrainians who enthusiastically came from abroad to “restore Ukraine” in the early 90s will not let you lie: the diaspora can look funny and naive in its archaic arrogance. But this is a reliable archive - a kind of backup - from which you can restore a lot (though not everything) in the event of a system failure and reboot. An example is the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which was driven into the catacombs, experienced physical destruction and complete structural destruction during the Soviet period, became a hostage in the Vatican’s flirtations with Moscow, but nevertheless survived in emigration and did not dissolve. And as soon as it became possible, she returned to Ukraine, recovered and multiplied.

Emigration, if used correctly, is a human reserve.

People who are ready to participate in the life of their homeland - even if they have decided to leave it - still love it, are nostalgic, experience irrational attacks of guilt and a desire to fix something and help in some way. The next generation of Ukrainians—both “internal” and “external”—will not feel the division between “those who left” and “those who stayed” as acutely as we do. It's not their choice. Not their injury. They will be able to communicate, exchange, come and stay forever - someday, in a peaceful future. Only if we can now maintain connections, build bridges over our traumas and fault lines.

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