Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine sparked catastrophic conflict in Europe. For the first time in many decades, this war also brought back the fear of nuclear war into the minds of societies.. While this doomsday scenario remains unlikely, Vladimir Putin's nuclear threats raise the risk of escalation. Officials in Washington and across the West are now looking for ways to respond to provocations without bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war..

The current crisis raises questions about the future of US-Russian nuclear arms control arrangements. Will Washington and Moscow return to the negotiating table, once again looking into the nuclear abyss? Or the arms race, like during the Cold War, will return again, but this time with new and even more dangerous features.?

Sarah Bidgood, director of the arms control program at the American James Martin Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation Studies, writes about this on the pages of Foreign Policy..

She notes that the war in Ukraine can be compared to the Caribbean crisis of 1962, which is often called the moment of the rapid start of the US-Soviet arms control process.. Indeed, the first five years from 1963 to 1968 were extraordinary.. During this time, agreements were signed on a " However, the connection between this crisis and the agreements signed after it is much more complex and not as linear as it might seem.. Historical records show several important nuances that should be taken into account in expectations today..

First, the Cuban Missile Crisis provoked a deep sense of distrust between Washington and Moscow that persisted long after Nikita Khrushchev withdrew Soviet missiles from Cuba.. As President John F. Kennedy told Khrushchev in November 1962, " In such a climate, progress on nuclear arms control has become next to impossible.. And this situation persisted for another 8 months after the crisis itself ended.. In the spring of 1963, US-Soviet negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban stalled over a verification problem.. Only after Kennedy proclaimed a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing in June 1963. the parties were able to make progress.

[see_also ids\u003d"

Secondly, the Cuban Missile Crisis allowed Kennedy to advance those arms control goals that were already under consideration and that he considered very important.. For example, among them was a nuclear test ban, negotiations on which began back in the days of Dwight Eisenhower.. Also, the first negotiations on establishing a line of communication between the leaders of the United States and the USSR also began under Kennedy's predecessor, but then they did not achieve any results.. Before embracing the presidency, Kennedy was obsessed with the need to put an end to the " Autumn 1961. he drew up an ambitious disarmament plan for implementation, which included initial versions of some later implemented ideas.

As the head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, George Bunn, later wrote, the Cuban Missile Crisis catalyzed these efforts, " In his opinion, this gave the President of the United States " At the same time, the Cuban Missile Crisis did not give impetus to new approaches to nuclear disarmament beyond those already considered by Kennedy and Khrushchev.. If a clear plan were not already on the table in front of them, it is not known how the crisis would have affected future nuclear diplomacy..

Third, many lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis focus on the importance of arms control.. However, few mention the role of the size of the US and Soviet nuclear arsenals.. But from 1962 to 1968, American stockpiles grew by almost 16%, while the number of Soviet warheads almost tripled.. William Perry, who served as US Secretary of Defense in the 1990s, noticed a surreal post-crisis situation. Because it was not " In his opinion, the assertion that Kennedy beat Khrushchev in Cuba "

The influence of this narrative was felt not only during the Kennedy administration. President Ronald Reagan pointed to it to justify military buildup during his first term..

“During the Caribbean crisis, the United States had a nuclear superiority over the USSR in a ratio of about 8 to 1. So when we stood up and looked them straight in the eye, they blinked,” Reagan said in 1983..

[see_also ids\u003d"

For him, the lesson of those events was not the danger of a nuclear war, but the need to have a reliable deterrence force.. The author acknowledges that the Cuban Missile Crisis is not ideal for the previous situation today.. Therefore, care must be taken in drawing any parallels.. At the same time, an assessment of the past may reveal how the war in Ukraine could seriously affect arms control.. Among the biggest hurdles to overcome are the rancor, mutual suspicion, and distrust that now characterize US-Russian relations.. Such an atmosphere would eliminate any negotiation of the flexibility needed to reach agreements.. The parties will look for ways to "

However, such an assumption suggests that nuclear arms control negotiations will resume, although this is not guaranteed.. Unlike Kennedy and Khrushchev, the current leaders of the United States and Russia have not been involved in formal negotiations on nuclear weapons since 2010.. Unless there was a “Strategic Stability Dialogue” that President Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin initiated last year.. It was supposed to " The United States suspended participation in these negotiations with the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The good news is that, as 60 years of history have shown, focused, persistent personal advancement by leaders in Washington and Moscow can overcome all barriers.. However, without a clear understanding of how the war in Ukraine will end, it is difficult to say when and whether there will be a political will to carry out such work in both capitals..

We can only say for sure that Putin's latest actions do not correspond to last year's joint statement by the US and Russian presidents.. It stated that “even in times of tension, the United States and the Russian Federation are able to make progress in achieving common goals in order to strengthen predictability in the strategic sphere, reducing the risk of armed conflict and the threat of nuclear war.”. It is not yet known whether both parties are able to meet such a relatively weak criterion in the future..