This year, the state of external stability of the economy is deteriorating, and gaps of payment balance are growing. According to the NBU, the deficit of the current account for January-February 2025 amounted to $ 4.9 billion. USA, increasing by 3.5 times relative to January-February 2024. And this despite the fact that in 2024 the annual deficit of the current account has already reached almost $ 25 billion. , or 13% GDP.
The deficit of the trade balance this year increased 1.6 times, to 6.2 billion dollars. According to the State Service, for the first quarter of 2025, the import of goods increased by 11.6%, and export decreased by 9.1% relative to the same period of 2024. Reducing exports can become constant, since from June 2025 the European Union will probably cancel the preferential autonomous regime for Ukrainian exports.
[see_also ids \u003d "
Other components of the current account were also demonstrated this year: net wages were reduced by 20.5%, and private transfer - by 16.6%.
The gap of the payment balance of Ukraine (the total deficit excluding international financial assistance) over the past 12 months has increased to $ 40.1 billion. , or 22 % GDP. And in December 2024, the annual gap was $ 37.5 billion. while in June 2024-$ 33.1 billion.
The main source of coverage of the deficit of the payment balance of Ukraine remains international financial assistance. The volume of this assistance in the state budget of Ukraine amounted to $ 42.5 billion. in 2023, 41.7 billion dollars. in 2024 and are expected at 56.9 billion dollars. in 2025 (see. rice.
In 2025, the Ukrainian government predicts the receipt of $ 33.1 billion. from the EU, 15 billion - from the USA, 3.5 billion from Canada, billion - from the UK and the ICBR, 2.2 billion - from the IMF, $ 0.5 billion. - From Japan. Contributions of external donors in the amount of $ 9.1 billion. will be transferred to the needs of the budget of 2026 and 2027.
[Related_Material id \u003d "
The situation with external financing will significantly deteriorate in 2026. After all, the obligations of international donors for the specified year barely reach $ 17.3 billion. The use of part of the funds raised in 2025 will increase their volume in 2026 to $ 25.4 billion. But even such an amount, obviously, will not cover the forecasted gaps of the budget and payment balance of Ukraine.
That is, an increase in the deficiency of payment balance in 2025 is still leveled by the expansion of the sources of its financing. But the situation with the availability of funding sources will deteriorate sharply in 2026 and will probably become critical in 2027. The planned external budget financing will double in 2026 and will become scanty in 2027 (see. table.
The expected volumes of external financial assistance to Ukraine in the context of creditors / donors for 2025–2027, billion dollars. USA.
Creditors / donors.
2025.
2026.
2027 I quarter.
EU.
33.1.
7.4.
1.8.
USA.
15.0.
4.0.
0.0.
IMF.
2.2.
2.3.
0.0.
MBRR.
1.0.
0.0.
0.0.
Canada.
3.5.
0.0.
0.0.
United Kingdom.
1.0.
1.0.
0.0.
Japan.
0.5.
2.6.
0.0.
Norway.
0.3.
0.0.
0.0.
Other creditors and donors.
0.3.
0.0.
0.0.
General financial obligations.
56.9.
17.3.
1.8.
Inter -term budget transfers.
-9,1.
+8,1.
+1.0.
Planned external budget financing.
47.8.
25.4.
2.8.
Sources: IMF, Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, author assessments.
In the software documents of the IMF, the specified problem of deficiency of external financing is camouflaged by the super -optimistic forecast of the payment balance for 2026, the deficiency of which will allegedly fall significantly and the needs of Ukraine for official financing will allegedly decrease sharply. So, the Basic Forecast of the IMF for 2026 includes unrealistic-optimistic improvements for the key position of the payment balance regarding the expected indicators of 2025. In particular, the IMF suggests:.
Improving the subject of foreign trade (by 1.9 billion dollars. ) due to the growth of export of goods by $ 6.4 billion.
Improvement of the balance of trading services (by $ 9.3 billion. ) by reducing the import of services by $ 5.8 billion. and increasing their export by $ 3.5 billion.
Reducing the purchase of cash foreign currency outside banks (by $ 9.7 billion. ) relative to 2025.
[see_also ids \u003d "
Such estimates of the IMF are also surprising: in 2026, the volumes of cash currency outside of banks should be less than the volume of 2021, and the volumes of service export-more compared to 2021.
The Forecast of the IMF for 2026 for the amount of the NBU foreign exchange interventions (to cover the balance of payment balance) also looks doubtful: the volume of interventions should be only $ 26 billion. which is 60% less than the expected volumes of 2025 ($ 42.7 billion.
In fact, there are no real prerequisites for the cardinal improvement of the state of the payment balance of Ukraine even in the case of the termination of hostilities. Significant needs for imports will be maintained (for the purpose of restoring the economy, energy supply, support of defense capacity), and the amount of private and state transfers will decrease. Therefore, you should not expect a radical reduction in the needs of Ukraine for external financing.
If in reality these needs are not satisfied, then the large -scale seizure of the NBU reserves and the sharp devaluation of the hryvnia will become inevitable. The depreciation of the hryvnia, in turn, can be a trigger for the banking crisis and corporate debt crisis, which will plunge the economy into deep chaos.
[see_also ids \u003d "
In such conditions, today it is necessary to move on to the balanced management of the country's currency and financial flows by:.
reduction of the unproductive outflow of national capital into external assets;
activation of dialogue with international donors about new forms of financial support for Ukraine;
ensuring the solid growth of international reserves in the context of large -scale external financing and revising the currency regulation system.
Unfortunately, the Central Bank is now moving in the opposite direction. Currency liberalization policy from the NBU in the form of mitigation of restrictions on capital and current operations of payment balance and transition to flexible course formation has become one of the levers of deterioration of the payment balance of Ukraine.
The canceled regime of a fixed foreign exchange rate gave the market participants clear guidelines for the dynamics of the foreign exchange rate and acted as a kind of anchor of stability. But the new regime of a flexible currency course deprived the subjects of the market of quantitative guidelines of the cost of the hryvnia, which with significant uncertainty has urged their foreign exchange expectations.
[Related_Material id \u003d "
The regime of flexible course formation does not objectively comply with the conditions of wartime and the presence of numerous structural shocks of the payment balance of Ukraine. He could not become a stabilization factor. Instead, he became a channel for the formation of additional demand for foreign currency and fed devaluation processes.
Note that the NBU foreign exchange interventions began to grow rapidly from the moment of proclamation of the strategy of currency liberalization, the transition to a controlled bastard formation and phased abolition of foreign exchange restrictions. The volume of pure currency interventions of the NBU over the past 12 months has increased from $ 28 billion. In April 2024 to 38.4 billion dollars. In March 2025.
For the first quarter of 2025, NBU NBU NBU, $ 9.4 billion reached the foreign exchange market. Compared to 5.8 billion dollars. for the same period of 2024. That is, in absolute terms, the seizure of foreign exchange reserves for the NBU intervention increased by 62%.
Such processes are not least due to the fact that the mentioned steps of the NBU destabilized the foreign exchange expectations of the population. So, in 2024, the population increased the purchase of foreign currency 2.5 times compared to 2023 (up to 12.2 billion dollars. ) And in January -March 2025, the population bought foreign currency worth $ 3.2 billion. which is 26% higher than January-March of 2024. An increase in cash foreign currency outside banks over the past 12 months has reached a historical record - $ 16.3 billion.
The actual waste of international reserves of the NBU to support foreign exchange liberalization, inclusive with flexible course formation, constantly exceeds the expected values. In particular, the NBU for 2025 predicted interventions with a volume of $ 24 billion. , and since January, the amount of intervention for this year is already $ 41.5 billion.
[see_also ids \u003d "
In 2024, 83% of international financial assistance to Ukraine was transformed in the intervention of the NBU in the foreign exchange market. That is, out of 41.7 billion dollars. only 2.9 billion assistance was aimed at increasing the international reserves of the NBU and $ 4 billion. spent on payments from the currency accounts of the government. And $ 34.8 billion. They acquired the form of NBU foreign exchange interventions, which partially covered wartime deficits, and partially added revolutions of dubious foreign currency liberalization.
Excessive expenditure of external assistance on unproductive interventions in the foreign exchange market, obviously, undermines the country's ability to confront future shocks of payment balance. In addition, outlined processes in the country's foreign exchange and financial sphere increase uncertainty, creating obstacles to real investments and more active restoration of the economy.
To prevent the crisis of the payment balance of Ukraine in 2026 and 2027, it is already necessary to take measures in a number of priority areas.
Firstly, to stimulate exports based on: mechanisms of affordable credit financing for exporters, launching a full-format system of insurance against military risks, stimulating the influx of foreign investment in the modernization of the production base and infrastructure, expanding logistics ties of Ukrainian exporters with European partners.
Secondly, to cancel the regime of the controlled flexibility of the course (which in itself enhances devaluation processes) and go to the fixed regime or creeping the binding of the hryvnia course to a pair of currencies dollar-Europe. Such a transition will stabilize the foreign exchange expectations of market entities and reduce the volume of national capital flights to external assets (currency, foreign securities and deposits), contributing to the improvement of the financial account of the payment balance sheet.
[See_also ids \u003d "
Thirdly, to suspend liberalization on capital and current operations of residents of Ukraine with non-residents before stabilizing the state of payment balance, as well as starting the NBU of effective monitoring of compliance with foreign exchange regime by the subjects of foreign economic activity.
Fourth, in the event of new powerful shocks for the payment balance of Ukraine, it is not worth excluding a return to a more stringent version of the currency regulation system operating at the beginning of the war.
Fifthly, but not in the last, to activate the diplomatic efforts of Ukraine and initiate negotiations with EU institutions and member countries on the creation of a special fund of economic support and support in the field of security of our country as part of the EU collective budget since 2026. Such a fund could be filled due to contributions of member countries from its own budgets in the amount of 0.25% of their GDP annually (proposal of the Supreme EU CAIA Callas), confiscated Russian sovereign assets and placements of EU defense bonds in the financial market.
[votes id \u003d "