As I promised yesterday, I offer an analytical overview of the situation in the Middle East after the announcement of an agreement between Iran and the United States. I’m breaking my review into sub-items for better understanding..
The following is the text in the original language. Ozhe, pershe. The collapse of the basic hypothesis: the pasta of seeing " The Iranian case demonstrates the collapse of the strategic axiom of Washington and Tel Aviv, which has been affecting Iran for decades: “The maximum pressure that causes internal discord will lead to the collapse of the regime.”.
This logic was linear and in fact appeared to be predatory. The strategy of the United States and Israel was based on the assumption that the accumulation of critical pressure - sanctions, military strikes, diplomatic isolation - would soon lead to political transition. Natomist produced a turning effect: consolidation of the system around the threat. The Iranian regime has demonstrated its ability to absorb surpluses, which its opponents systematically underestimated. For ideologized, security-oriented regimes, survival is an absolute priority - for the sake of which the stench is ready to sacrifice the economy, the well-being of communities and inflict part of the infrastructure. Coming out of the crisis, Elita feels not weakness, but triumph.
Friend. Operational efficiency versus strategic results. I have already written extensively about this, starting from another period of war. We face the classic dilemma of military strategy: operational successes are not the same as political changes.
Israel has unprecedented tactical freedom of action - having learned from Iranian leaders and leaders of Iranian proxy forces, launching targeted attacks on infrastructure, demonstrating technological superiority. All these actions are not small for the conversion mechanism of the change of power in Tehran. The stagnation of military force demonstrated its effectiveness with the given economical and material gains, but it turned out to be impossible to change the internal political architecture of the regime. The further reduction of nuclear facilities has been recognized by force as either impossible or necessary.
The paradox of the situation lies in the present: the more precise the blows, the more clearly the stench illustrated the boundary that could not be crossed without catastrophic side effects. Iran has learned to live in the middle of this boundary.
Third, my favorite: separation of strategic cultures: USA versus Israel. The agreement has revealed a fundamental rift in the common threat between allies - and this rift is structural, not situational.
For Washington, the priority is risk management and stabilization. The United States is thought of in terms of categories of global flows - maritime routes, energy security, prevention of a great war that would tie up its resources. The benefit for them is a rational tool for fixing errors and turning them into forecasts, first through nuclear dossiers.
For Tel Aviv, the threat is existential, and the stench is so articulate. Streaming or compromise with Iran is perceived as a defeat, leaving Tehran saving its “ring” inflow (Tabaat Ha-Esh) through proxy measures. It also clearly showed the limited possibilities of Israel to dictate the order of the day to the superpowers if their strategic vectors diverge. This is a great awareness between the powerful military forces - the forces that are determined to win the battle, but will not be able to reformat the political map of the region, and, in essence, the collapse of Netanyahu’s rich policy.
Fourth – regional context: pragmatism of the Persian inlet regions.
The monarchies of the Persian tributary made a choice that was inconsistent with the supporters of the hard-line anti-Iranian coalition. Instead of becoming a pillar of such a coalition between the US and Israel, they adopted a strategy of hedging and de-escalation. One blame - the UAE, but here, sooner, the result after the fact will be intermediate.
The logic of the Arab countries is clear here: economic stabilization and security for powerful merchants became important for the ideological war with Tehran. For Riyadh, Doha and Abu Dhabi, Iran is an unsafe place, or a place with which to live. This is strategic realism, not sympathy. I have repeatedly felt the same thought from Arab experts. As a legacy, the diplomatic isolation of Israel’s hard line in the region, which became one of the lasting results of the conflict.
P’yate – Iran’s strategic assets have been deprived of outstanding assets. Iran will emerge from the crisis having saved its main geopolitical trump cards, and they will not become the subject of urgent negotiations.
A very asymmetrical importance: the establishment of a threat to world trade in educational places - the Hormuz prototy and Bab-el-Mandeb - has lost its entire functionality. This is an instrument of global blackmail, which is the reason for the United States to sit at the negotiating table and which is nowhere known after the signing of the agreement.
The regional border, unaffected by blows, has preserved architecture. The interconnection of different fronts and partner structures is not just a recruitment of allies, it is a system that must be dismantled with targeted strikes.
Let's face it, the very fact of direct dialogue with Washington turns Iran into a league of diplomacy and weakens the effect of extreme isolation.
Shosta is a pasta of peremozhtsa, or what will happen in Iran after please. Please is not the final point, but a starting pistol for the internal struggle for resources. This fight can be fought against Iran by those who were not destroyed by either sanctions or military strikes.
KVIR emerges from the crisis as a dominant force - economical, powerful and symbolic. Aside from the dominance of scarcity in the minds and the dominance in the minds of resources – there is a difference between. The deficit is consolidated through the hierarchy: if nothing is shared, factional appetites will be smothered by a powerful threat. If there is a real resource for the subdivision, the hierarchy becomes a pervert, not a destroyer. This is a classic pasta peremozhtsa.
The split line in the middle of the Corps will not go away after all - the stench is already there, just frozen. Different commanders control different economic enclaves: ports, border crossings, provincial markets. Reconstruction and lifting of sanctions mean the transfer of these enclaves or their legalization, which automatically creates a conflict of interests. The generation of officers who fought in Syria and Iraq is looming under the older generation of revolutionaries.. They stink, they respect what they “earned”. The power vertical, financial departments and Basij have different economic logic and different patrons in the middle of the system.
The key to determining the upcoming cycle of Iranian politics: who is the real manager of resources after the KVIR order? As foreign investments and contracts go through government ministries, technocrats consider it important. Since KVIR, through its controlled holdings, trumps contracts at the level of implementation, Pezeshkian’s order becomes a shop window without replacement: a manager of legitimacy on the side and a buffer of dissatisfaction in the middle.. The historical pattern is unambiguous: after the cutaneous great external shock, the Corps expanded its economic presence, rather than sounding.
But the most underestimated scenario is not a conflict between the order and the KVIR, but a split in the middle of the Corps itself through the division of supplies. Great pennies collapse vertical from below more effective, lower pressure. The closest historical parallel is not Iranian, but Russian: the division of assets after the collapse of the USSR and the splits of the power structure into competing clan groupings is much more effective, even if it is not a foreign official.
And vrashti-resht, the new supreme leader – Mojtaba Khamenei, who is deprived of an architectural problem.
The rise of Mojtabi Khamenei to rule is a product of general consensus, not revolutionary tradition..
In view of my father, who for decades has been building a system of opposition between religious authorities, civil technocrats and security forces, we cannot structurally replace the function of an arbiter - because he is a product of the same thing. If republican institutions or darkened elites try to appeal to Rakhbar in order to balance the appetites of the generals, it will be a big deal that there is no one to appeal to. The Supreme Leader and KVIR became one and the same.
The very fact of the gradual transfer of power from father to son is an ideological catastrophe for the system, which brought down the Shah itself under the demise of the liquidation of the monarchy.. For a significant part of the traditional Shia clergy and the Republican kril, Mojtaba is the “neo-shah” of the turban.
While the war lasted, this split was masked by the need for survival. If you stop feeding the peaceful division of resources, you will become visible.
In this configuration of statements, you can be a manager, not an arbiter. And the administrator, who has exhausted a resource or failed to fairly distribute it, becomes unnecessary.
Good luck closes one chapter of Iranian history. Advance - about what the system can do, which has learned to live under pressure, has learned to live without.