If the last 10 years of Western history were marked by a long struggle between liberalism and populism, then Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine forced many liberals to recognize the fight as over and the enemy defeated, writes American political analyst, New York Times columnist Ross Dauta..

And such assertions are not baseless.. Putin's war dealt two blows to populism: direct and indirect. The first is shame for every populist leader, European or American, who has ever said kind words to Putin, or even considered him an opponent whose statecraft revolves around our own incompetent elites.. Such advances have now ended in retreat, forcing populists to marginalize themselves or make a shameless U-turn.. That is, do not be surprised if by 2024 Donald Trump will turn into the largest Russian hawk..

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But the more devastating blow is indirect nonetheless. The invasion of Ukraine showed how insecure and helpless the populist instinct becomes when faced with an adversary who is not easy to fit into its focus on domestic Western corruption, its narratives of treachery and elite stupidity..

This certainty is not unique to right-wing populists, but rather can be seen in anti-establishment voices of all stripes.. Among those who did not expect an invasion of Ukraine because they did not think that US intelligence could achieve any results. Those who did not expect a Ukrainian rebuff because they believed that any regime supported by our foreign policy elites would be too unfortunate to survive. The media is looking for new narratives that fit populist prejudices because the picture of Putin’s aggression and Western unity is not.

Against this backdrop, the Republican Party of the United States, which was the main engine of populism, seems to be returning to its pre-Trump state.. But you can see the snag in this with the assertion that if populism lost, then liberalism surely won... The return of Republican militancy revives good old American nationalism.

And what's true of the Republican Party is also true more generally.. The much admired Ukrainian fighters clearly fight more for nationalism than for liberalism, some of them do not fight for liberal ideas at all.. The European country doing the most to help them is Poland.. Only yesterday it was the cornerstone of Western liberalism because of its nationalist and conservative government....

None of this is amazing. The unity and energy of a liberal society always depend on forces that are not entirely liberal - religious piety, national pride, a sense of providential mission, a certain degree of ethnic solidarity and, of course, the fear of some external enemy.. Liberalism at its best directs these forces. Liberalism at its worst oscillates between ignoring them and suppressing them.

None of this should be surprising: it has always been the case that the unity and vigor of a liberal society depend on forces that are not entirely liberal—religious piety, national pride, a sense of providential mission, a certain degree of ethnic solidarity, and, of course, the fear of some external adversary.. Liberalism at its best directs and directs these forces; liberalism at its worst oscillates between ignoring them and suppressing them.

Among the optimistic liberals of the moment, you can see this change happening.. “The defeat of Russia will make possible a ‘new birth of freedom’,” Francis Fukuyama wrote last week, “and bring us out of our stupor over the decline of global democracy.”. The spirit of 1989 will live on" Continuing with an interview with Greg Sargent of The Washington Post, Fukuyama presented the current moment as an opportunity for Americans and other Westerners to re-choose liberalism due to the recognition that the nationalist alternative is "

But one of the key lessons of recent years is that the spirit of 1989 was itself the spirit of a resurgent Eastern European nationalism, as well as liberalism.. This is one of the reasons why countries such as Poland and Hungary have greatly disappointed the liberals in their subsequent development... up to the present moment, of course, until Polish nationalism suddenly became the decisive stronghold for the liberal democratic West..

Therefore, liberals who watch the floundering of populism need a balanced understanding of their own position, their dependence on nationalism and particularism and even chauvinism.. Their task is to sift through these forces so that the good (admiration for the patriotism of Ukrainians and the courage of Vladimir Zelensky) outweighs the evil (boycott of the Russian prodigy and the threat of nuclear war).

And they should definitely avoid the illusion that Putin’s vicious intrusion means that all complaints about the West’s internal problems can be dismissed as empty and false….

The idea that Putin's Russia is some kind of effective post-liberal or traditionalist alternative to the problems of the West and one whose military forces can simply pass through Eastern Europe was complete nonsense.. Yet Western problems remain: America's power is in relative decline, China's power has skyrocketed.. None of what I would call America's major problems has evaporated just because Russian troops fail to approach Kiev..

Since these issues are crucial to understanding where populism came from in the first place, it is foolhardy for liberals to claim victory based on shifts in the international order, simply brushing aside internal discontent.. Populism's poor adaptability to this particular moment has made it possible for its enemies and critics to. But they will miss the opportunity if they convince themselves that the external challenge has somehow eliminated the internal crisis..