The ratings of government support in Russia are gradually declining. Ur-patriotic hysteria weakens. What is leading now in the minds of Russians: a refrigerator or a TV set? This is on air "The Observer. LIVE "spoke with an ex-employee of the Presidential Administration of Russia, an economist and politician Dmitry Nekrasov.

- What now all the same wins in the heads of Russians: a refrigerator or a TV set?.

- Difficult question. Of course, the TV is in the lead. But the refrigerator is making itself felt more and more.. If to speak the language of dry figures, now the ratings of support for power are 5-7% higher than before the Crimean history. And at some point they were higher by 20%. That is, the peak of hurray-patriotic hysteria passed.

If we look at the period from 2016, then we see a trend towards a decline. These are official reports. A possible reason is that during this period nothing bright has happened in foreign policy life. It is worthwhile only to wave with his fists, shoot rockets - and this trend will change.

In parallel, economic difficulties, of course, lead to the fact that the ratings are gradually creeping down. But now they are still higher than before the Crimean history, despite the sanctions, the fall in real disposable incomes of the population, the decline in retail trade turnover.

- Let's look at specific figures. A few weeks ago there were data from the poll of the "Levada Center". So, now 48% are ready to vote for Putin. As early as 2015, 62%. Severe fall.

- Yes, in comparison with 2015 and 2016, it is obvious the fall. But it is more reasonable to compare all this with longer periods. Compared with periods of peace and tranquility, the ratings are now higher. Compared with the period of active hostilities - lower. The dependence is obvious.

- Now actively discussing the scenario of developments in Russia, associated with the nomination of a successor. Let this is not the most likely path, but still often referred to in this context by Sergei Shoigu.

- This is a guessing on the coffee grounds. But I do not think the candidacy of Shoigu is most obvious. I estimate the successor scenario as very low. But theoretically it will rather be a figure not from the first series of evidence. It will be someone from the second line, someone is relatively unexpected.

- Is there a risk that on the eve of the elections, in order to re-score the ratings and provoke military hysteria, the Kremlin will go on a serious escalation of the situation in Ukraine?.

- I think there is a probability, but not 100%. There are just a lot of other factors. Yes, the rating has decreased, but for the regime to win the elections of 2018 - not a problem.

- It is still important, with what result to win.

- I think for them turnout is more important in this situation. I do not think, that for them the above-mentioned result is so extreme.

There will be an aggravation or not - it depends more on how the relations with the USA will develop. Now it is even safer for the Kremlin to shake their fists in the Syrian direction than in the Ukrainian.

Once again: the escalation in Ukraine is an option. In difficult situations, the Kremlin will use the aggravation to mobilize its support. But now there are no guarantees that this will be so, for several reasons. First, there are other factors. Secondly, the Syrian map is now even more interesting for the internal audience - "we are great, we are keen on Americans".

- Do you think that in the case of Trump you can still play the Syrian card?.

- I'm talking about the Syrian map for internal use. But even in the case of Trump, this card is on the table. Although I did not initially believe in a big deal with Trump. That is, even if it had been concluded by some miracle, it would hardly have been possible to adhere to it for long. And yet the map on the table. Always said that Putin from the very beginning very successfully played it. This is an additional trump card, which he uses so far, despite all the problems associated with it.

- You know, after a missile strike, the United States started talking, that soon, very soon Putin will hand over Assad. Do you think, probably?.

- Maybe he'll give it up.. And why would he? I think, it will easily surrender, if something is offered to him for it. I just do not believe in a big deal, so it seems to me that nothing will be offered. But on the whole I admit that I will surrender.

- Objectively, how much worse were Russians living compared to 2013? And with what they connect it? With the evil West, who wants to destroy Russia, or still with the actions of his leadership, with the annexation of the Crimea?.

- As for the first question, there are objective data. Real disposable income decreased by 10%. According to some information - by 13%. Turnover of retail trade - also by more than 10 percent. Some markets, for example, the sale of new cars, fell 2 times compared with the peak. Obviously, the Russians began to live significantly worse. This unevenly affected different groups of the population. But as a whole, they began to buy less, live worse.

Another thing is that this is not primarily associated with the Crimea. First, and objectively, the greater impact was on oil prices than Western sanctions. And people subjectively speak about oil prices, and about the evil West. But there is no causal connection in the minds of most Russians: they took the Crimea - they began to live worse. How many did not talk with people, the template is broken here.

There is a third point. The Russian population, in principle, has already adapted to the new reality. For example, for a long time, the volume of consumer lending. Now the credits started to recruit again. That is now consumer optimism has intensified, and the economy is showing signs of growth. The fall in GDP stopped, inflation in general fell to 4% - many positive phenomena. But despite this, real disposable incomes of the population are almost the only indicator that continues to decline. And it is unclear when it will stop. I think, in the long run, this, of course, will have an impact on the moods of Russians, but now I do not see this relationship.

- A common opinion: sanctions have a long-term effect, and after a while can seriously complicate the situation in Russia. Because of this, Moscow can change its policy, and thus it will be solved if not the problem of the Crimea, then the problem of Donbass. What do you think of it?.

- Obviously, sanctions affect the long-term economic health of Russia. But very long-term. This is not the influence that in the moment leads to a catastrophe. Do they understand Russian elites? Perfectly understand. Population - I think not up to the end.

Do Moscow want to lift sanctions? Want to. What are you ready to give in order to do this? Crimea - no. Donbass is possible. But the sanctions themselves will not lead to any deal. Because in the sanctions regime, Russia can exist for decades. Putin and the economic bloc understand that it would be good to lift the sanctions, because all this is unpleasant. But before them there is no choice: the lifting of sanctions or death. This issue will be an element of bargaining, including the Donbass, but one of many. And it seems to me that some sort of settlement of Russia-Ukraine-Russia-West relations before Putin's departure from the post of head of state is impossible. Just because many need to save face.

- G7 countries allowed expansion of sanctions against Russia last week. In fact, is there a political readiness for this from the West? And what in theory could deal a serious blow to the Russian economy?.

- While I do not see such readiness, but, probably, it will gradually increase. Again, we do not know what the unpredictable Trump will do. In addition, elections in Europe will soon end. If there are Merkel and Makron, then probably some tightening of the position towards Russia. But while I do not particularly see the political will to tighten sanctions.

You can at least try to adhere to the already imposed sanctions. We see that the same service oil companies provide their services, as before, only now through transit offshore. And external debt is refinanced, despite a direct ban on attracting long-term financing. That is, Russia and Western business have learned to bypass sanctions.

Going to the steps that will have a serious momentary effect, for example, disconnection from SWIFT, the West is now and is not close at all.

As reported by the "Observer", Ukraine has extended sanctions against Russia.

Join the "Observer" group on Facebook, stay tuned!.