After the All-Russian action of the supporters of Alexei Navalny, we finally got rid of the illusion that the boycott of elections is an effective strategy. Even if the appearance had some significance, it will not decrease so much as to cast doubt on the result of the election. The very mythology of "declining turnout at any cost" is based on the fact that the result of the election is predetermined: they say, this is not the election of the president of the Russian Federation, but the next "election of Putin". Actually, it is not so. All the elections that Putin won were a very serious test. And the elections of 2018 have every chance to turn for him a "Pyrrhic victory" or even a shameful defeat. To see this, it's enough to recall the circumstances of Putin's past "triumphs," writes Vladimir Golyshev in a column on "Radio Liberty".

Let's start with the first - in 2000. This victory had two components: military and political technology. From the first it is clear: someone very timely blew up houses in Moscow and Volgodonsk, and Prime Minister Putin was presented to the country as an "iron people's commissar", determined to solve the "Chechen problem". Meanwhile, the clever Boris Berezovsky not only managed to inflict a crushing defeat on the Fatherland-All Russia bloc in the 1999 parliamentary elections, but also forced Yevgeny Primakov to withdraw from the presidential election. As a result, Putin did not have a single dangerous competitor. Gennady Zyuganov by that time was not the same. The rest (Grigory Yavlinsky, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Aman Tuleyev) were considered as notorious outsiders. The victory in the first round of the "Chechnya's conqueror" was ensured.

The outcome of the 2004 elections was also predetermined, although they did not really mean much. The main battle was won by Putin six months earlier, when he prevented Yukos from getting under parliament. If in 2003 Putin did not dare to arrest Khodorkovsky, then the parliamentary elections could end with quite a different outcome, and the presidential elections too. Yukos was going to hold a new parliament in the constitutional reform, turning the president into an "English queen". Putin's half-measures would not have been saved. He ventured - and won. As a result, the victory of United Russia and Rodina (the CPRF spoiler) in the parliamentary elections. And a guaranteed second presidential term for Putin, who, in addition to the "conqueror of Chechnya," became even "grave digger of the oligarchs". Nikolay Kharitonov and Irina Khakamada did not intend to win it.

It was then that an unprecedented rally in commodity markets began to yield results. Ahead was a decade of steady growth in the revenue side of the budget and an investment boom. Life has become better, life has become happier. On these "golden yeast" a "Putin majority" arose, 70-80% of passive loyalists. The main task of the Kremlin was to extend them to elections, which most Russians would prefer to skip, so as not to be distracted from the consumption of hitherto unprecedented benefits. The bet was always made on a high turnout, which guaranteed the authorities the best result.

In 2007, parliamentary elections for the first time became an empty formality. No "March of Dissenters" could convince the "Putin majority" that there was something wrong in the country. In the presidential elections in 2008, 70% could get any representative of the Kremlin, Putin, Medvedev, Ivanov - it does not matter. In any case, Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky came out as extras.

Everything changed in 2011, when Putin decided to return to the presidency, which provoked a split in the elite. Medvedev arranged many: "United Russia", business, "Washington Regional Committee", the population. But Putin's entourage somehow managed to persuade him to leave his armchair (all the negativity that the country is now clearing up, possibly the consequence of Medvedev's cowardice). Putin began his new ascent with the humiliation of the "party of power". Parliamentary elections culminated in a carefully planned scandal: the CEC grossly falsified the election results, United Russia received an undeserved majority in the parliament. This caused a high protest wave ... Actually, this was the main find of Putin's staff - to channel the negative in the direction of "United Russia".

Nevertheless, the outcome of the presidential election in 2012 was not a foregone conclusion! If the main parties put "new faces" instead of their obviously hopeless leaders, it could turn out differently. From "Fair Russia" to the election could quite come out Oksana Dmitrieva, the Communist Party could expose the Nobel laureate Zhores Alferov, and "Yabloko" it was worth nothing to restore the membership of Alexei Navalny in his party and make him a candidate. With such a list, the matter could have reached the second round, in which Putin could easily lose. But the parties exhibited shabby leaders, Putin added to them the court oligarch Prokhorov and won, because he could not win, gaining 63% - seven percent less than Medvedev in 2008.

And now let's take a look at the landscape on the eve of the presidential elections of 2018, forgetting the "truth" that "Putin will still win". The first thing that catches your eye is the absence of the "Putin majority". Several years in a row, the welfare of the population is declining, there is no visible gleam. Yesterday's loyalists long ago turned into skeptics and grumblers, to drag them to polling stations - to themselves is more expensive. And for the remaining one and a half months of Putin, they will not love more. Rather, vice versa. Therefore, the current election campaign is not so similar to what we saw in 2012. "The All-Russian People's Front" does not blown up in fanfare, Uralvagonzavod does not threaten with a sledgehammer, and the "unconquerable Putin" himself is in no hurry to "die near Moscow". Until now, we have not seen a single "PUTTING". What catches the eye against the backdrop of endless "navalnings", the organization and conduct of which no one particularly hinders.

In my opinion, it is obvious that in 2018 the Putin headquarters is deliberately working to reduce turnout. If only "loyalists are involuntary" (state servants, communal workers, people in uniform, etc.. ), Putin will still be able to get the result he expects. But every independent voter is a cat in a poke, from which one can expect any trick. Especially since the list of candidates at this time was far from harmless. Zyuganov for the first time ceded his place to the changer who could well attract not only the "nuclear electorate" of the Communists, but also the "former Putin majority". It can be said that these are the first presidential elections in the newest history of Russia, in which at least one participant does not play a giveaway.

But even without Pavel Grudinin, these elections could turn out to be a catastrophe for Putin if the formula "for any candidate other than Putin" became as popular in 2018 as a slogan for any party other than "the party of crooks and thieves" was popular in 2011. What exactly caused Navalny to abandon the strategy, which fully justified itself 6 years ago, is unclear. But the noise raised by his paradoxical "strike" could well work against Putin if the "former Putin majority" wakes up to the polling stations and votes not at all like the president wants. After all, the bar that Putin himself installed, even a victory with a "Sobyaninsky result" (in 2013, in the election of the mayor of Moscow, Sergei Sobyanin received 51.37% of the vote) turns into a defeat. What can we say about the second round, which, after the nomination of a strong candidate from the Communist Party, became quite possible!.

In a word, there is far from zero chance that the upcoming elections will turn out to be a shame for Putin. Especially if we take into account the hidden discontent of the bureaucracy and oligarchs, for whom the "toxic" Putin has turned from a guarantor of well-being to a source of problems. This discontent could well lead to an "Italian strike" - the pre-election campaign, voting and vote count will go without regard to the interests of "candidate number 1".

But even the most rude and shameless use of administrative resources will not allow adding to the real Putin result more than 12-15%, and this may not be enough. And if this happens, how will the participants in the "strike" explain to themselves: for what reason did they deny themselves on March 18 the pleasure of becoming the cause of Putin's humiliation?.

Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Join also the TSN group. Blogs on facebook and follow the updates of the section!.