Over the past year, the Ukrainian establishment began an active ideological campaign. Its official name: the war with the "Russian world". Russian culture, literature and the language itself are declared inalienable components of the "Russian world", with which it is necessary to conduct a merciless struggle. To Complete Destruction. Or all of us death!.

That, in fact, the social movement "Russian World" is the enemy of both Russian literature and Russian culture, the Ukrainian establishment does not care at all. After suffering a crushing defeat in the fight against real economic, political and administrative reforms, the establishment tries to play the last, the remaining card - ideological. It is curious that our patriotic "patriotic" establishment completely repeats the strategy of its main enemy, Vladimir Putin. The same is true of accusations of total corruption and inefficiency of the Russian economy, of remarks about the total collapse of the main hope of the Zero - to gain a worthy place among the Western powers - only reiterates the spiritual bonds, the historical role of the assertion of the "Russian world" and other etudes of leaven patriotism. You can even make a table like this: Putin's reaction to the problems facing Russia, and the reaction of our establishment. One to one will be.

Is such a danger for Ukraine now for Putin? Not in the least degree. It is extremely convenient, it allows to form an image of the enemy for the empire of Putin, but in essence, ideological danger for Russia does not represent.

Meanwhile, in recent history, the Ukrainian Maidans twice put Putin before the possibility of losing his power.

The first time it happened in 2004. The history of the first Ukrainian Maidan shocked Putin and his entourage. It should be noted that by that time there had not even been formed the structures dealing with the advancement of Putin's ideology in post-Soviet countries. They first began to emerge in 2004, when it turned out that the usual methods of administrative resources in the post-Soviet space might not work. The example of November 2003 in Georgia, when absolutely obedient, at first glance, the country, suddenly within a few weeks was free from Putin and his servants, shocked Putin and his advisers. That is why in 2004, Putin not only sent his chief political adviser Gleb Pavlovsky to the elections in Ukraine at the time, but in 2004 the FSB began massively creating quasi-public organizations through which it is planned to influence the post-Soviet countries, first of all, Of course, in Ukraine.

A very important question: why did the first Maidan not lead to a split in Ukraine? After all, the confrontation was then extremely fierce, true, purely ideological in nature. However, after the inauguration of President Yushchenko, the conflict almost died away. This was promoted both by external and internal reasons.

First about external.

Several factors that predetermined the comparatively "soft" pressure of Putin and his entourage on the situation in Ukraine in 2004-2005.

First, Putin and his advisors at that time, especially in the most important days of autumn-winter 2004, had no strategic vision of the situation and the program of action. They just tried to help Yanukovych operatively.

Secondly, Moscow very strongly believed that at the last moment Leonid Kuchma will show strength (precedents were in Odessa and in the Crimea) and the problem will be solved by itself.

Thirdly, probably, the candidature of Yushchenko and the way he led the election campaign calmed the Moscow experts. They already understood that he does not have a real power, and did not expect serious danger from him.

Fourthly, at that time, Putin was absolutely confident in his power. The opposition was defeated, the media put under control, Mikhail Khodarkovsky's "landing" was an example of everything before his eyes. Putin's fear then was of a somewhat academic nature, he was not afraid for his power, but for his control over Ukraine.

Now about the internal causes.

It is Gleb Pavlovsky who, according to rumors, has the idea to make the main issue of the 2004 election the theme of the Russian language. But regardless of who was the author of this idea, it was the question of language that became the main topic of the struggle in those presidential elections. But the situation for the ideologists of this plan "did not work out".

In 2004, in the presidential election against Yanukovych, the main opponent was small business. In those years, he grew rapidly and managed in 2004 to consolidate and powerfully fight for his rights. The first Maidan was the apotheosis of small business, but, alas, by the way, did not bring him any dividends. A small business, then the question of the Russian language "did not behave".

However, in the country the confrontation was still very fierce. It's hard to say to what it would have come if it had not been for Leonid Kuchma's decision to abandon the power option he had been rumored to have been influenced by his son-in-law Pinchuk. A very important role was also played by the fact that Viktor Yushchenko himself on Maidan announced a number of future decisions that were accepted by society.

In particular, Yushchenko firmly promised to be president and Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking citizens of the countries, he also promised to give the official status to the Russian language.

In fact, by the New Year the conflict in society was extinguished. And already since January 2005, Viktor Yushchenko began revision of the declarations of the Maidan. Of Yushchenko's Maidan declarations, less than 10 percent. But society was no longer ready for real protest actions.

About the second Maidan - next time.