Russian strategic culture: Intelligence (Part 1) The study of Russian strategic culture is such a ramified area that it is almost impossible to cover it in one fell swoop. Moreover, the term “strategic culture” itself was born precisely from an attempt to understand the behavior of the USSR. I present to you the first part of my research on Russian strategic culture, where I collected the main thoughts of Western researchers of the second half of the 20th century who dealt with this topic.

The following is the text in the original language. Jack Snyder: The Founding Father The founding father of this theory was Jack Snyder, who first coined this term (“The Soviet Strategic Culture”) in his 1977 report for the RAND Corporation.. The method of evidence was an attempt to explain the irrationality of the Radian approaches - why the Radyans believe in the categories of a nuclear war otherwise, below the USA. Snyder's testimony became revolutionary, and it gave a shout out to the panicky approach to the decline of "

Snyder confirmed that American strategists had mercy, respecting that their Radian colleagues thought so much, it stinks. At the end of the day, war is a mathematical equation of expenditures and profits; in the Radyansky Union, war is a product of historical evidence, geography and political structure.. We define strategic culture as the totality of ideas, emotional reactions and basic patterns of behavior, which members of the strategic community have emerged through learning and imitation. Apparently, strategic decisions are made not in an intellectual vacuum, but through the “prism” of previous victories and defeats (especially before the Other World War).

Snyder saw a number of key points, below:.

Offensiveness: The Radian culture evolved into active, offensive actions in line with the nuclear strategy. Moscow interpreted the concept of “deterrence” differently – not as a passive threat, but as a readiness to strike first, as if war is imminent.

Nuclear protection as a “mega-artillery”: For the Radyansky kerivnitsva this is no less a political tool. The SRSR was preparing not just for “mutual impoverishment”, but for survival and victory in a nuclear conflict.

The role of institutions: Strategic culture is formed in the middle of bureaucratic structures. In the Soviet Union, the army had little monopoly on strategic thought; it imposed its doctrine on all members of the Soviet Socialist Republic: “war is an inevitable tool of class struggle.”.

Colin Gray: Strategy as Anthropology Advance follower – Colin S. Gray) – expanding on Snyder’s ideas, transforming “strategic culture” from an analytical tool to a fundamental philosophy. While Snyder focused on bureaucracy, Gray looked at the problem more broadly – \u200b\u200bthrough the prism of history and anthropology..

Gray insisted that strategy cannot be “post-cultural”. Strategists are people who grew up in the cultural, religious and historical world. In contrast to the predecessors who respected that culture does not “flow” into strategy, Gray emphasized: strategy and culture. You cannot reinforce a strategic choice from the cultural code of the one who makes that choice..

Gray has a lot of respect for devoting how geography shapes strategic culture. In the fall of Russia, we saw the problem of the availability of natural cordons. This gave rise to the culture of “expansion for the sake of security”. In order to feel stolen, Russia must control the flow of water, creating buffer zones. The continental mentality has also become an important element. Russia is a typical land power (Heartland), whose strategic culture is based on control of territory, and not on pandering to the sea or "

For Gray, there was no fundamental difference between the Muscovite kingdom, the Russian Empire and the USSR. Taking into account that the Russian strategic culture is characterized by a belief in those who are not strong, centralized power can turn the country into chaos. The article emphasizes the military importance as a single reliable instrument of diplomacy. " Colin Gray was a “strategic pessimist”: he realized that the fall of communism cannot be changed even though it is strongly rooted in Marxism-Leninism. Unfortunately, these precautions were largely ignored.

Fritz Ermarth: Siege Mentality The theme of the “siege mentality” has become a central theme in the works of Fritz Ermarth – the one most often transcribed in Ukraine. Erwart, despite his obvious work at the top of the US intelligence community (let's face it, as the head of the National Intelligence Agency), brought a very pragmatic dimension to the theory.

He confirmed that Russia sees itself as an “island” near the enemy’s sea. In the face of the United States, captured by the oceans, Russia overflows from both sides. This creates the psychology of a “covered fort”, so that any influx of calls is accepted as a destructive action. This mentality is used by the authorities to justify authoritarianism: “since we are in trouble, we cannot allow ourselves to be disturbed.”.

Ervart said: for the Russian strategy it is not important what the threat to the seemingly real Sunset is. It is important that the Kremlin respects this reality. Even though NATO is even about a “defense alliance,” Russian culture automatically translates it as a “sharpening instrument”. The same analyst noted that the current foreign policy of the Russian Federation is related to the continued internal survival of the regime.

In order to maintain its status as a “great power,” Russia is hesitant to constantly demonstrate power. Since she doesn’t dominate the vessels, then, in her mind, she begins to fall apart.

According to Ervart, the Russian strategic culture is not to distinguish between “peace” and “war”. Peace is simply a phase of preparation for the onset of the ongoing stage or the conduct of war in other ways (energy, intelligence, etc.).

There will be further.