Russians can not be called imperialists in the classical sense of the word - they tend to identify themselves with the state, statehood, with the "master over themselves" and "strong hand". But the territorial immensity of Russia is really important for them.

Talking about the "Slavic unity" are things more prosaic, namely, fears for the fate of the military-industrial complex of Russia, an important element of which were enterprises in Ukraine and Belarus. In a situation where there is no more economy and science in the country, "to keep something together" is allowed only by bombs and missiles.

Ukraine does not have a real state for President Putin. Under the weakness of the state in Russia, it is customary to understand the presence in it of a mechanism for the replacement of power, real political struggle and real elections.

Relations between countries can become "if not amorous, then at least civilized" with the new adequate power in Russia.

A Russian and American historian, art and culture theorist, philosopher, film critic, philologist, professor of the New York University Mikhail Yampolsky told about this and many other things in his interview to the "Observer".

We bring to your attention the second part of the interview with him. Read the first part here..

- Do you remember about the all-Russian protest on March 26, extremely mass. But you also remember the euphoria about "Krymnas". That is, on the one hand, Russians demonstrate a desire for democratic transformation in the country, and on the other - remain "infected" "the virus of imperialism". In your opinion, which trend will win in Russian society, in which direction will it develop?.

- I do not really agree with the idea that the Russian people are a people that bases their identity on the imperial.

Crimea is a special story, because Crimea is a personal myth of many Russians. It's a paradise, it's a childhood, it's Koktebel, it's Chekhov, Voloshin and so on.. But if you look at the attitude of Russians towards the occupation of Donbass, it does not cause the slightest enthusiasm and interest. Nobody needs Gorlovka, waste tanks, mines ... Everyone really is up to the lantern.

I think that identification in Russia is based on identification with the state and with statehood. It was an identification of the Soviet type. Soviet people basically identified themselves with the state, which nowadays in Russia, of course, few people like. Hence this protest against corruption is quite specific.

This consciousness of statehood is very characteristic of the recognition of some master over himself, some kind of power, some strong hand. All this is essential for them, and especially in a situation where there are no other forms of self-identification. In this sense, they tried to somehow use and Orthodoxy, but it does not work very much in such a multi-confessional complex country, even after a rather lengthy history of atheism.

The idea of ??statehood, which is embodied in a strong leader, has much more significance for Russians than imperialism. Although I think that the territorial immensity of Russia is very important for them. Russia has always thought of itself in the category of geographical maps - people look at their huge country and somehow identify themselves with it.

But if we think about what really is the basis of this imperiality, then we will see that it is completely uneven. For example, there is no special imperialism in relation to Central Asia - all absolutely do not care about these Asian republics, no one wants them back. It does not even exist in relation to the Caucasus, although they have dug out part of Georgia. Armenia, Azerbaijan do not care about anyone, although Baku has long been part of Russia.

We are talking about some kind of Slavic unity, about "Novorossia" ... But in fact it seems to me that the real mechanism was the military-industrial complex. The Russian defense industry was largely in Ukraine. All these helicopter engines, navigation systems for rockets, optical devices - all this was manufactured in Ukraine and in Belarus. So I think Putin had a fear that the entire Russian defense industry - the only link with the cult of statehood and state power - could collapse. From this, such a hysterical reaction to these conversations about leaving for NATO, for Europe and for. Therefore, it was difficult for them to release Belarus and Ukraine neurotically.

In general, what is the state? This repressive apparatus is the siloviki and the army. If you look at all the hysteria around May 9, the Victory Parade, you will notice that all of it is around the army, because this is the main symbolic sphere of identifying Russians with strength. Putin always positions himself as a symbolic figure embodying power. But it seems to me that this is something other than mere imperialism.

In Russia there is no more economy, no science. Only bombs, missiles and their connection with statehood allow something to be kept together.

- I remember, somehow in the Kiev-Pechersk Lavra, at the very beginning of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, distributed propaganda leaflets in which it was about how good and wonderful when the head of state is "king-father," the emperor. How do you assess the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the formation of the myth of the new "father-father"? Do Russians really need a "king" or an "emperor" today?.

- I do not think that Russians need a king. Perhaps, some small group of people would like to have a king, for example, because they like Nicholas II. I think that in fact, historically, beginning with Peter I, who, as is known, destroyed the patriarch (meaning the church reform of Peter I. - Red. ) The Russian Orthodox Church was subordinated to the state.

Since then, the church fulfills an ideological function under the monarchy. It is no accident that Uvarov came up with this trinity: "autocracy, Orthodoxy and nationality," that is, Orthodoxy was part of the state complex.

I think that Patriarch Kirill really serves the state, and the state generously pays him for this service. Russian Orthodoxy is the Orthodoxy of the Byzantine model, which was completely subordinated to the emperor and served imperial interests.

But I do not think that Orthodoxy needs a king. It needs to be built into the state power system. It can be the president or anyone - I do not think that there is an obvious monarchical bias.

- How do you see the future of Russia and the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations after Putin? In what perspective can fraternal relations be restored between Russians and Ukrainians? As you understand, today, after what the Russian Federation has done and continues to do towards Ukraine, there is no need to speak of any brotherhood.

- I will answer this question, but first I want to tell about the interesting polemic that was between two political scientists - Ekaterina Shulman and Alexander Morozov. Shulman called Ukraine an example of anomie - the collapse of statehood. Morozov objected to her - say, what kind of disintegration of statehood? There is a president, an acting parliament and so on..

In my opinion, this is curious, because this is what Putin has repeatedly said: "Ukraine is not a state". It's not that in Ukraine, some kind of people, not the same identity, not that culture. No. Ukraine for him is something that does not have a real state.

The weakness of the state, in their opinion, is due to the fact that in Ukraine there are real parties between which there is a real struggle, there are real elections and so on.

We must admit: in Ukraine there really is a weakness of the state. But this arrogance towards Ukraine is largely based on the view of the state, which would like to be absolutist (it is not so, because everything is already falling apart) in relation to a country in which they do not see strong state power. For them, this is a sufficient justification to climb into Ukraine with their army.

Now about the future of relations between Ukraine and Russia. I think that Russia's military intervention in Ukraine led to the growth of nationalism, which was not so strong before, and to the formation of Ukrainian statehood on the basis of some nationalistic ideas.

Of course, there is some kind of "plus" in this, because in part this helps to unite the nation, to increase self-awareness. But there are also tangible "minuses", because always, when the growth of nationalism as the basis of identity occurs, provincialization occurs, and the country loses that open character that is necessary for the modern world and for its dynamic development.

All this seems to me in some sense unsafe, although understandable.

I think there will be a strong cultural and ideological disengagement. Wipe out the memory of what happened, it will be very difficult. Nevertheless, I believe that after Putin's departure from power, there is no reason why normal relations could not recover.

Because the Donbass is absolutely artificial nonsense. All this is based on gopnik and bandits who receive support from Moscow. It is enough to remove this support, and everything instantly normalizes. Although this is a rather complicated process, as people are traumatized by what happened. I suppose that there are strong anti-Ukrainian sentiments.

But if people come to power in Russia more open, more moderate, normal, deprived of aspirations to destabilize Ukraine, but on the contrary, wanting to establish relations with it - I see no reason why these relations could not be restored. Maybe they will become not very loving, but in any case civilized.

I understand: while these people are sitting in the Kremlin, it is impossible. But they will leave, and the countries will exist for another century. So everything is not so hopeless.

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