Some analysis on the Gulf War in view of Trump's procedural decision to declare the "
The following is the text in the original language. Trump has completed a legal maneuver - voting “completion of military actions” to circumvent the constitutional deadline of Congress on May 1. This is the only thing that has changed specifically and been verified. The Ormuzka duct becomes virtually closed. Negotiation is for the deaf. Aragchi's visit to Putin yielded no results. Pakistan dismantling the infrastructure for the negotiations - this in itself is a red flag.
Trump is in a psychological pasture, as Krugman accurately described. The maneuver from Congress paradoxically weakened its position: having relieved internal pressure, it immediately changed the incentive for Iran to hurry.
Iran reads signals, not words. Transmission of a proposition through Pakistan is a maslahat u diya (a concept in the Islamic political Duma that allows principles to be adopted for the sake of a living system): a demonstration of readiness to speak without public chanting about peace. The new KVIR policy is legitimized through the demonstration of resilience - which means that it is also impossible for those who are the first to gain time in the future.. Internal collapse within three to six months is low: food cards are a tool of control, not a sign of weakness; land routes continue to function; Mojtaba as " A split in the middle of KVIR – rather than wishful thinking without verification data.
Russia is trying to play an active role as a mediator, and Washington is clearly embracing this role.. The proposal to take Iranian uranium is “not on the negotiating table” - the United States understands what it can do to force the very actor who is trying to isolate. Putin’s main goal is not to destroy Iran, but to stop the crisis in order to get rid of the important interests of Ukraine, thereby saving the flow of water with Israel and the countries of the Persian influx at the same time.
The OAU left OPEC and positioned itself as a neutral Maidan, just outside the blessing of Washington. The defense project with Ukraine is unfinished, it will be lost until Trump gives the green light - and there is nothing to gain yet. Our activity in the region is growing. The signs of which we are already wary of.
In such a situation, Trump is the first to be angry - the election calendar is a tough one (mid-term elections at the end of 2026), gasoline prices are already higher than several dollars, markets have switched from TACO to NACHO (Not a Chance Hormuz Opens). Horizon - three or four months maximum.
Iran has a long horizon, but not an endless one. Six to nine months until the internal pressure becomes unbearable. Ale tse does not mean capitulation - it is not a moment, if maslahat is in the cosmetic way.
The world's economy is adapting completely, but irreversibly - every month of closed Hormuz is more expensive than before, non-linearly, before the adaptive capabilities are exhausted.
The most likely scenario for this type of outbreak is that insignificance is frozen for the next three to six months. This is not a sudden change and not a temporary crash - not a structural result: there is no sufficient incentive for the actors to exit again right away, all the obvious negotiation formats have been exhausted or blocked, and the maneuver between Trump and Congress has paradoxically changed.
Krugman correctly identified three faults: his Trump, his ignorance and justified distrust of Iran to the American side after leaving the JCPOA in 2018. But there is a fourth factor, which I don’t completely agree with: Iran can’t first earn money not for what it doesn’t want, but for the fact that the new KVIR system will require taxes, any way I can help my audience. Thus, the offending parties are psychologically blocked symmetrically - and thus avoiding frozen insignificance is not just a realistic, but a structurally inevitable result in a short-term perspective.
The only thing that can destroy this jealousy first is not diplomacy and not military escalation, but an economic shock, which remains unavoidable for American voters until the fall of 2026. However, this will result in what Krugman calls “mutual agreement without formal favor” - a single format that allows both parties not to acknowledge differences in public.
For Ukraine, in this picture there is one principle of caution: the frozen Iranian conflict is a short-term scenario for Russia, at least if it is completed. Moreover, Moscow is not interested in anything, despite the public rhetoric about mediation.