The army that Russia sent to Ukraine in February 2022 clearly did not meet its goals, although neither Moscow nor Washington recognized this at the time.. The limited capabilities of the Kremlin forces were put on display.

The invasion exposed Russia's boast that it has the second strongest army in the world.. And the initial phase of the war was evidence of massive failures throughout the chain of command. Logistics turned out to be dysfunctional, and there was a lot of evidence of poor training and provision of troops. The planned blitzkrieg capture of Kyiv dissolved into a fierce battle in which the Russians failed to capture the critical Gostomel airport and were subsequently pushed back despite a seemingly decisive numerical advantage..

“In the early stages of the invasion, the myth that the Russian army was modern and capable of meeting Western standards was quickly dispelled.. Other considerations about her operational planning and tactics also burned up in the fire of the battles.. Having failed in the early stages of the war, the Russian command returned to the traditional Soviet approach to warfare, using massive artillery bombardments combined with the senseless expenditure of soldiers' lives during massive wave attacks, ”writes a non-permanent researcher at the Center for European Political Analysis (CEPA) in his assessment..

Despite much publicized modernization, the incompetence and corruption of the Russian military leadership, poor weapons maintenance and logistical miscalculations have shown that Russia's armed forces have not changed much since the days of the USSR, especially its ground forces..

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The widely publicized “Serdyukov reforms,” named after Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, called for a massive structural reorganization of the Russian army that began in 2009.. They drew on Soviet experience in Afghanistan and used battalion tactical groups (BTGs) of about 800 soldiers, which were deployed as combined arms maneuver units.. Such groups were to be kept on high combat readiness.. Serdyukov wanted to unite the BTG into permanent brigades, while reducing the size of the army, reducing the command structure, creating a professional sergeant corps and increasing combat readiness..

His resignation in November 2012 provoked a debate in Moscow about the future of these reforms.. Before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the changes introduced by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu were nothing more than adjustments to the Serdyukov plan, and not a general overhaul.

Serdyukov's reforms, as well as the Russian military's operations in Chechnya and Syria, help explain why the Russian defense establishment believed the army was up to the task of invading a neighboring country.. The capture of Crimea in 2014 reinforced this sentiment among Vladimir Putin's inner circle.. And announcements about Russian weapons systems, especially nuclear upgrades, new ballistic missile submarines, and improved armored vehicles – including a new generation of T-14 Armata tanks – have helped bolster that confidence..

“And yet, despite the obvious setbacks of 2022, it would be a mistake to underestimate the resilience of the Russian army or even deny its capabilities.. While it can't match the Ukrainian military when it comes to training and morale, the Russians have learned from the Ukrainians and are learning fast.. The Russian army of 2023 is a very different beast than the Russian army of 2022 that existed in the early stages of the war,” Michta writes..

Russia has demonstrated that it can fight and mobilize at the same time: its initial strength of 300,000 soldiers has now been boosted by the drafting of 400,000 contract soldiers.. The Russian military was able to tie up numerous Ukrainian forces in and around Bakhmut, forcing the Ukrainians into a war of attrition and inflicting heavy losses on them.. Although this was only possible with reinforcements in the form of Russian mercenaries. The Russian army has also shown itself capable of building defenses in depth and maintaining public loyalty to the war..

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“Putin's army has shown that, at least for now, it has the necessary resilience at a time when Western resources, especially weapons and ammunition supplied to Ukraine, are rapidly drying up, and the West is trying to increase production volumes.. While the war highlighted the need to rethink Russia, it also confirmed some truths, especially when it comes to how the Kremlin uses military force.. She recalled, for example, the importance of armored vehicles, long-range precision fire and air defense for conventional large-scale warfare.. These truths have faded into the background in most Western armies over the past 20 years, when the troops were reformatted to participate in foreign operations in emergency situations..

According to Lieutenant Michta, the Russians have demonstrated that quantity and mass cannot be replaced, especially when it comes to ammunition.. They effectively use even obsolete Soviet-era equipment, depleting Ukrainian ammunition stocks..

The Russian military admitted their unsatisfactory work. And in January, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov reacted to this with another round of reforms.. According to his new plan, an army corps will be deployed in Karelia on the border with Finland to counteract the country's entry into NATO..

Gerasimov's reforms also involve the restoration of two military districts - Moscow and St. Petersburg, which were merged in 2010 and became part of the Western Military District. Gerasimov also said that Russia will add three motorized rifle divisions to the combined arms formations in the occupied Kherson and Zaporozhye regions..

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“It is still too early to draw final conclusions, but it is clear that the Russian army that entered Ukraine last year is a thing of the past (not least because it has lost so much equipment, including more than 2,000 tanks and 4,000 combat. And now Moscow is trying to find a new format that reflects the military experience gained over the past year,” the author believes, adding that the Russian army lacks the morale of the Ukrainian troops. However, the Russians have more resources.

Most importantly, Putin appears determined to stay in this fight for the long haul, putting the Russian economy on a war footing.. So the war will go on for a long time yet. And the West should pay attention to this.