European producers suffered from the loss of the Russian market? This is a myth that does not stand up to the verification by figures, according to Daniel Gros from Brussels Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels. Summing up the three years of the existence of counter-sanctions imposed by Russia in response to European sanctions, Gros and his colleagues came to conclusions that the Russian leadership would hardly have rejoiced.

DW: Three years have passed since the beginning of Russia's retaliatory sanctions against the European Union. You came to the conclusion that they most likely and primarily harmed Russia itself. You thereby indirectly contradict the Russian President Vladimir Putin, who spoke positively about counter-sentiments. What gives you an excuse to disagree with him?.

Daniel Gros: It's clear that if you cut off your country from the cheapest supplier with an embargo, you can only lose. And this was the case with the Russian counter-sentiments on European food products.

- But you also write that Russia lost because the sanctions resulted in a decrease in the purchasing power of Russian consumers ... - Especially in the case of food products. This can be clearly seen from the fact that the index of purchasing power decreased, calculated precisely with regard to the food basket. It is logical, because European products were the cheapest and quality, they had to be replaced by more expensive ones. As a result, Russian families were forced to spend more on them, which reduced their purchasing power.

- You do not touch on the analysis of the consequences of European sanctions in your analysis, but concentrate on counter-sanctions against the EU. Your conclusion is that they practically did not harm Europe. How so?.

- It's enough to look at the bare numbers. They show that the volume of European exports to Russia has decreased, but only because the volume of Russian imports has fallen. This is due to the fact that at the same time the recession began in Russia due to low oil prices.

The only sector that has suffered more than others is just the export of food products. The counterforcements, naturally, touched upon them. But here draws attention to itself, that the European manufacturers appeared, apparently, very flexible. Because in total the export of food products from the EU did not suffer at all, it grew. In other words, Europeans managed to compensate for the loss of the Russian market through the expansion of exports to other countries. Therefore, the cost of Russian counter-forces for European producers is almost zero.

- Your conclusions contradict those studies that talked about the loss of billions of euros and thousands of jobs, for example, the analysis of the Austrian Economic Institute Wifo. What would you say to your opponents in defense of your optimistic report from the point of view of the EU?.

- Firstly, it must be clearly remembered that Russian imports collapsed primarily because oil prices fell by half. This was a fundamental change in the situation that can not be ignored. Secondly, the Austrian study suggested that fewer Russian tourists would come to Europe because of the risk of sanctions. But here we also need to proceed from the fact that Russians began to travel abroad less, losing revenues because of the crisis caused by the fall in oil prices, and not by sanctions.

Therefore, I would say that the lion's share, if not all European exports to Russia decreased primarily because of oil.

- If the impact of counter-forces was minimal, then the EU from the economic point of view can easily afford to continue to pursue a rather tough policy toward Russia?.

- Undoubtedly. The European economy is more than 10 times higher than the Russian economy. It is much more flexible and has a powerful industrial base. Russia exports to the EU, in fact, only oil and gas, and several other commodity positions. Russia for the EU is an interesting market, but secondary and not vital for the growth of European economies.

- Tighter sanctions on the part of the US jeopardized the project of the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline. He, from your point of view, is needed by the EU and Germany?.

- The energy market, primarily the gas market, has changed. It is no longer necessary to assume that Europe will depend on gas supplies from Russia. So it was in the past, but today the dependence is not so great, and tomorrow - perhaps it will not be at all, because Russian gas will be able to replace tankers with liquefied gas.

In the case of Nord Stream-2, I think it's worth keeping aside politics. This is in any case, not the deal that is important for Germany. What kind of project is this: the Russian side is building the second branch of the Nord Stream for the Baltic Sea by its own money. Whether she will need it, nobody knows this.

Germany is exactly able to do without it, because even the first branch is not completely full. Maybe a number of European pipe suppliers will lose orders. But even if Nord Stream is expanded, the second branch will most likely remain unfilled. Russia, to be exact, Gazprom, will throw some money into the wind, but to interfere with them is not the stone about which it is worth breaking the spears.