The Kremlin lost the diplomatic confrontation over the Crimea. Three years ago, the Russian authorities were confident of the imminent collapse of Ukraine and the automatic recognition of the peninsula as part of Russia. Now they have to dodge, inventing an explanation of why the West did not agree with the "Krymnas", writes specifically for the Crimea. Realities political scientist Sergey Stelmakh.

The head of Russian diplomacy, Sergei Lavrov, tried to explain to Russians why the plans for a "big deal" with the West over the Crimea failed. It turns out that NATO member countries "took offense" at the Kremlin, which allegedly prevented Brussels from including Ukraine in the sphere of influence of the Alliance. The annexation of the peninsula, the Russian minister believes, played a key role in this.

"NATO members are offended that their project for the full absorption of Ukraine into its zone of influence and the inclusion of Ukraine in the North Atlantic alliance, the inclusion of the Crimea in its plans for the military encirclement of the Russian Federation - these plans failed," Lavrov said in an interview with Russian journalists. As a result, the US and EU have frozen joint projects in the sphere of global security and joint struggle against terrorism, the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

In fact, we see the continuation of the political line that Moscow took after the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States. In February this year, Kremlin analysts and propagandists completely changed the rhetoric about the prospects for Russian-American rapprochement. They "suddenly" realized that bidding around the annexed Crimea could "spoil the image" of Moscow in the eyes of other geopolitical players: Iran and China. Although several months ago the Moscow political beau monde anticipated the speedy abolition of sanctions, the informal recognition of Krymnas and the return of Ukraine to the sphere of the privileged interests of the Kremlin. Russian authorities spread a simple message in all possible formal and informal channels: the new administration in Washington will close its eyes to the Russian excesses in the Crimea and the Donbas.

The whole "anti-Americanism" of the Russian authorities was reduced to attempts by President Vladimir Putin to agree to send Russian soldiers to die in Syria for the interests of the Western coalition. The Kremlin wanted to get the Crimea in exchange for allegedly a joint fight against IGIL and the settlement of the conflict in Syria. Although it was initially clear that the Russian authorities intend to destroy not the Islamists, but the moderate Syrian opposition. By early 2016, Moscow's appetites had become more modest. Sergei Lavrov and his subordinates agreed to unofficial recognition of the annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula by the White House. As soon as the representative of Trump said that Moscow should leave the Crimea, the Russian authorities changed their shoes in the air, pretending that they did not expect to agree on this issue.

Crimea - the personal defeat of Sergei Lavrov. Judging by the information context, in the spring and summer of 2014 the Russian Foreign Ministry was confident that a conflict with the West around the Crimean "referendum" could be put on the brakes. The protracted war in Ukraine, painful sanctions, constant criticism of Moscow for the occupation of the Crimea, the failure of the "big deal", to which the Kremlin was counting, showed that Russia is only a regional player. Attempts to challenge Washington's influence on world affairs, liquidate or significantly weaken the Ukrainian statehood and divide the world into spheres of influence failed.

This is a complete fiasco of Russian foreign policy and the so-called "Crimean diplomacy", which Moscow adopted in early 2014. It was a complex of military and political actions in which diplomacy is used exclusively within the framework of special operations and misinformation of rivals. Moscow began negotiations with opponents, not before a concrete action, but after it in order to consolidate an advantageous result. Vladimir Putin many times lied to the heads of Western states on the participation of the Russian army in the seizure of the Crimea and the war in the Donbass. A year later, he confessed that he personally ordered the occupation of the peninsula. Bluffing is an integral part of politics, but in the West, diplomatic etiquette is also respected. Putin and Lavrov could lie about as much as they liked in public, but in private conversations with the leaders of the United States and the EU they should immediately put the cards on the table. But they deceived and dodged even where they could speak directly.

This approach revealed a strategic flaw: "Crimean diplomacy" was effective only in the short term. As soon as official Kiev and the West developed a joint policy of opposing the Kremlin revanchists, Moscow could no longer use the fact of surprise and confusion. The unprincipled nature of the Russian authorities has made any arrangements with the Kremlin meaningless. Political analysts have repeatedly pointed out that the ultimate goal of Kremlin diplomats is to circle Washington around the finger by slipping the cat in a sack. Why did the Russian authorities consider Americans and Europeans to be so stupid - a topic for a separate conversation. But the fact is clear: in the "Crimean trap" it was the Kremlin.

Now, in order not to look like a loser, Sergey Lavrov is forced to use street rhetoric, trying to explain why the West continues to "kick" Russia for the annexation of the Ukrainian Crimea. The irony of the situation is that Moscow's aggression only accelerated the process of Ukraine's rapprochement with NATO. Prior to the "Krymnas" and the massacre in Donbass, the question of North Atlantic integration was debatable. A year after the beginning of the war, the accession to the Alliance was ready to support the majority of Ukrainians.