This question has long stood before the Russian autocracy, and it does not matter how much it is realized by the class servicing the autocracy. However, judging by the nervous impulses emanating from the Russian ruling elite, we can conclude that the process of existential insight began. After an unprecedented collapse in 1991 (in the absence of external and internal threats), the autocracy managed to get out of the coma and even demonstrate viability. But today it is obvious that the Russian system was able to stand on its feet, sowing on the oil drug, and at the expense of the adrenaline that had become its fear - both of society and the ruling class and the world around the new collapse of the global nuclear power. However, even in liberal circles there are still those who believe in the "adaptive abilities" of autocracy and even in its renewal perspective. What: this belief (or hope?) Is quite natural - not everyone is ready to admit that they live in lost time and in a system that has become an anachronism, writes Lilia Shevtsova for Radio Liberty,.

Meanwhile, the evidence persistently proves not only the historical exhaustion of the Russian autocracy (this was obvious for a long time), but also that the system itself reproduces dysfunctionality, shaking its own supports. The Moscow "renovation" and "Platon", which awakened the newly dormant sections of the population, are only the most obvious examples of the current tendency of the Russian authorities to shoot their own legs.

Apparently, the authorities can no longer jump out of the funnel, which it itself dug out and into which it sucks more and more deeply - unfortunately, together with the country. I will list the main "factors of explosion" that the Kremlin creates, bogged down in this "funnel of inevitability".

At one time, the Argentine political scientist Guillermo O'Donnell introduced the term "impotent omnipotence": autocracy is sooner or later doomed to become decrepit and infirm. It is this process of growing impotence of absolute power that begins in Russia. There are doubts as to how much Putin is able to play the role of arbiter in internal disassembly, not to mention his ability to solve common management problems, especially during a crisis. It is difficult to avoid the impression that the president has become a hostage to his own "vertical" - not even its servants, but the very mechanism of unilateral decision-making that can not ensure either their adequacy or their feasibility. The very "vertical" as a method of government, being the object of raider seizure on the part of selfish private interests, began to destroy the foundations of statehood.

The Kremlin's clear hope for decay and demoralization of society as an optimal environment for the preservation of power eliminates the chances of reforming the system from above, increasing the threat of its devastating collapse. It's a bitter irony: fearing the repetition of 1991, the authorities only bring it closer, but in a situation more unfavorable for themselves and for Russia.

The dull social ferment that began in Russia speaks of the persistence of drive in society. True, it is unclear how and when this drive will take the form of an organized system, not just a personified Alternative. But the authorities themselves tirelessly work for this Alternative, strengthening its revolutionary beginning.

Editorial site is not responsible for the content of blogs. The editorial opinion may differ from the author's.

Join the groups "Browser Blogs" on Facebook and VKontakte, stay tuned!.